NEW TIMES

January 1992

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Oleg Gordievsky: How I crossed the border

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A SOVIET WEEKLY

NEW TIMES

No. 2, 1992
Founded 1945

The government can unfreeze prices, but it can't fill the counters. Who will do it?

p.8

COMMONWEALTH

POLITICAL LIFE *M. Shakina* **A GHOSTLY TRANSPARENCY** 4

GEORGIA *A. Sokolov* **THE HOUR OF THE OPPOSITION** 7

ECONOMICS *M. Shakina* **PRICES ARE FREE. FREEDOM IS PRICELESS** 8

LITTLE BY LITTLE *Yu. Oklyansky* **ZOMBI & Co** 12

WORLD AND US *K. Pleshakov* **THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA** 14

WORLD

POLITICAL FORECAST *Ye. Bazanov*

THE SUPERPOWER HAS NOT PASSED AWAY YET 16

RUSSIA – KOREA *L. Mlechin* **OLD CLIENTS ARE NOT SERVED** 19

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA *J. Valenta* **"MY HOUSE IS WHERE THERE IS FREEDOM"** 20

GERMANY *I. Mlechina* **THE FORGOTTEN DRUM** 22

NIGERIA *Ya. Borovoi* **IF DODO ALLOWS...** 25

Our correspondent in Nigeria comes to the conclusion that chiefs are always right

p.25

THIRD BASKET

NEW TIMES INTERVIEW *O. Gordievsky*

"THE DEATH SENTENCE IS A REWARD FOR ME" 28

SECRET SERVICES *I. Filippova* **YELTSIN'S SECURITY MONSTER** 33

BEHIND THE SCENE *I. Lagunina* **THE POW WILL LIFE IN KABUL** 34

MANUSCRIPTS DO NOT BURN *S. Tyrowski*

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE NAZI TIMES 38

LIFESTYLE *Chi Cagov* **CAPITALISM – IT IS EASY** 42

CULTURE AND POLITICS *A. Lam* **MISS HANOI IS UNEMPLOYED** 48

FROM OUR MAILBAG **(2),** PEOPLE **(44)**

Cover by Victor Brel



The Soviet spy who defected to the West appears in public wearing a wig and makeup. He still fears his former KGB colleagues

p.28

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From our mailbag

■ I would like to dispute the widespread opinion that we are a nation of lazy-bones and cannot work. I contend that it is difficult to find in the world such industrious workers as in our country. It so happened that in the last 74 years the labour enthusiasm of our peole was displayed not at the main work place, but at home, in the kitchen garden, on the individual plot of land, because the state, having assumed paternal functions, did not provide enough food and clothes for us and proper service and medical care. We had to do all this ourselves, spending our own and official working time, all our physical and mental energies. That is why people saved their forces at the main place of work. This is particularly true of women who rushed out of their factories and offices five minutes before the end of the working day, with the food they managed to buy during working hours. They hurried home where they had to tidy up their flats, cook meals, mend clothes or line, and tend to their children till late at night. In fact, they did what in civilized states is done by various services for money. However, we do not even have money to pay for these services. That is why we do everything ourselves, without going to dry cleaners, laundries and repair shops. That is why our magazines are full of pieces of useful advice on how to do at least anything from nothing. While reading these magazines I wonder at our poverty. For instance, today I read a piece of advice on how to mend a pen which costs 35 copeks. People run with bags from shops to the market, and there is always a crowd near shops where something is for sale. For half a year you remember the day when you bought tights, for instance, and even at a regular price.

Yes, we are sullen and irritable, because we get tired very much, do not sleep enough, have no good food, and rarely go out to breathe fresh air. Is it a nation of lazy-bones? A poor old age awaits us in the future and, moreover, old people will have to work to earn their living. It hurts me to realize that we cannot afford the articles available to millions of people in the world. An acquaintance of mine from Alaska recently visited our country. A single woman, she has three sons and an adopted girl to bring up. She owns a two-storey house with several rooms and two cars. She is a teacher. Does she work 100 times harder than our teachers do? I do not envy her, though it is a pity to have the reputation of lazy-bones while working from morning till night. I do not even have enough money to buy apples, not to mention a bar of chocolate for 17 rubles. True, the Alisa exchange buys chocolate wholesale, seven dollars for a bar. The trouble is, however, that I do not have even seven dollars. I have not been able to earn them.

N. Morozova,
a teacher and librarian
with a 26-year record of work
Omsk

■ We, war veterans and veteran workers read with indignation a letter from some Dmitry Sergeyevich published in "From our mailbag" section of issue No. 46/91. This man writes that he served in the army under the command of Vlasov (a Red Army general who went over to the Nazi side) and fought against Communists. Without twinges of consciences he extols Hitler and the fascists, alleging that they wanted to bring "freedom" to the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is an outrage on the bright memory of soldiers killed in action.

We think it is an invented name and the journalist who prepared this letter for publication expresses the interests of the surviving enemies of our homeland.

N. Pozdnyakov, N. Akulyonok and V. Slesar
Vitebsk Region, Belarus

■ In one of the issues of your magazine I read about the burials of German POWs in our country.

"National rebirth" in post Soviet era

■ How does the "natioal rebirth" look in post-Soviet conditions? The reader probably thinks that the republics have adopted government programmes for the revival of national culture and language, have founded institutes for the study of national history, and are developing the national economy.

I also would like to think so. However, "national rebirth" is a new variant of the old Soviet policy of shifting the blame on the external and internal enemies. Today's external enemy is insidious Russia, which captured the freedom-loving republics by force and does not want to let them go. Here, as in the case of world capitalism, everything is reduced to propaganda cliches, because there is not enough ability to clear up the real state of relations.

However, I am much more alarmed by the attempts to discover internal enemies, non-natives, because considering the uncivilized state of our society, Lynch law can be used against them. The events in some regions indicate that such practice can well be used there. Some republics openly declare that the rights of nations stand above human rights. At the same time, many leaders talk about the desire to "return" to Europe, forgetting that human rights have long been recognized as the supreme value there. Economic crises often lead to the growth of nationalist sentiments. Suffice it to recall the spontaneous pogroms in Ferghana and Dushanbe and attacks on Gypsies and Caucasians in some cities of Rusisa, despite the fact that the governments of republics did not conduct nationalist propaganda.

The history of the Soviet Union has always been a "policy turned to the past." Its role has not changed in the "sovereign" republics. If a national conflict breaks out, the scholars of both sides organize a thrilling debate on who was the first to descend from the tree and who first came to this territory. They also clear up who offended the native population and when, who captured land from this population and what land must be taken away from the neighbour, because it is "ours." Pseudo-scientific publications of this kind are first of all mastered by the people, because one of the main fea-

2,000 graves of German POWs

"Not enough money to buy apples"

What are the sources of financing?

There is such a cemetery in our town, too. About 2,000 German POWs lie there. The cemetery is so desolate that I am pained to look at it. Some keep bricks on graves as if in a storehouse. Other simply throw rubbish on graves. They do not care that people are buried there, and they are not to blame that it is their last resting place.

If anyone gets interested in our cemetery, please let me know.

Anatoly Petukhov, 36
Zelenodolsk, Tatarstan

■ My letter to you probably expresses my attitude to the progressive stand of your magazine. Nevertheless, I have a favour to ask.

I suggest a topic rather pressing, in my opinion. Numerous parties and movements, often hardly distinguishable between one another, have been formed in the last few years. Nearly all of them have their newspapers or magazines, hold congresses and conduct propaganda campaigns. Funds are necessary for these purposes. There arises the question as to the sources of financing these small organizations. Does our law envisage the public financial accounting of the parties and movements?

As I said above, I ask you to do me a favour, and you may not reply to my letter.

Y. Gaiduk
Kharkov

■ I wonder sometimes why our republican authorities allow the distribution of *New Times*. In our communist Daghestan, the radio, television and the press express only the opinion of the leadership. Obstalces of every kind have been put up to prevent the printing and selling of independent newspapers.

G. Gamidov
Daghestan

■ I welcome the decision to abolish domicile registration and think that your magazine should hold a discussion of readers, lawyers and legislators on this subject. As a magazine which published *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* for the first time in our country, *New Times* should convincingly demonstrate to all doubting people that domicile registration must only be formal. No economic considerations can justify serfdom. Some contend the time has not come to abolish domicile registration. Freedom can never be limited in time.

Vladimir Veryutin
St. Petersburg

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

■ If any maniac set fire to an oil well he would be declared a lunatic and placed in a mental home. Hussein set fire to nearly all wells in Kuwait and caused a tremendous damage to it. But he continues to rule Iraq. The United Nations proved unable to deal with this maniac and thus tacitly blessed others of his kind to commit similar outrages. I would ask you to comment on this in your magazine.

Fyodor Timoshchuk
war disabled person
Kherson Region

■ A grave mistake was made in the article "Of Democrats, free enterprise and law" (No. 50/91) through the fault of its author Lukin. He writes that I was on the board of a commercial bank. I headed the supervisory council which ensured the transformation of the state-owned housing and social bank into a commercial one. As soon as the new bank was registered, I immediately left the council, which was abolished. I repeatedly explained in the press all the motives of my behaviour, which did not contradict the law in any way. It's a pity that, voluntarily or not, facts are perverted till now.

Sergei Stankevich

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

tures of a Soviet citizen is a combination of the feeling of resentment and injury (on the part of world capital, aliens, chiefs and even house managers) with the superiority complex. Following the policy of "national revival," one can stubbornly talk about Mickiewicz and Mickevicius and a lack of culture among the Russians and the Poles. But this will hardly add anything to Lithuanian culture.

It is a very popular occupation today to find appropriate quotations in the works of eminent people. For instance, Dostoyevsky's diaries are often quoted in Russia. In Moldova (former Moldavia), they cite Mihail Eminescu. The magazine *Columna* once deemed it necessary to cite the following thoughts of this great novelist: "The face, appearance, is the surest sign of Romanian origin of Bukovinians living on the east bank of the Prut River... When you cross the Dniester, you meet the unexpressive faces of northern Slavs. It does not befit us to be friends with everyone whom we meet, even if he is of Russian origin.

The desire for national rebirth based on the feeling of resentment and stories about the former greatness almost inevitably degenerates into the nationalist movement. On coming to power, the former dissidents are unable (even when they want) to go against natinalist sentiments which they had created themselves in a way. The laws passed in the republics which proclaimed freedom and democracy often have little in common with freedom and democracy. Such are, for instance, amendments of Lithuania's criminal code which envisage a severe punishment for "activity designed to undermine sovereignty." Such is also article 62 of Ukraine's criminal code under which a person who voted for the return of the Crimea to Russia or Izmail to Moldova can be sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Examples of this kind are the laws on citizenship which do not virtually envisage double citizenship designed to ensure the rights of national minorities. Moreover, economic restrictions for "aliens" and "immigrants" are envisaged in almost all "sovereign" republics. If we are to talk honestly, citizens are divided into bad and good depending on their national origin.

Yan Rachinsky,
co-chairman of the Moscow branch of the Memorial Society

POLITICAL LIFE

A ghostly transparency

Drawing by Igor Shein

The promissory notes republican leaders issued in Minsk are depreciating worth. An inevitable reality? Or the result of rashness? At any rate the number of optimists both in the West and at home is dwindling



Marina Shakina

The December 30 Minsk meeting of the eleven revealed that the euphoria the CIS raised was premature. The erstwhile republics of the erstwhile Union, though setting up bureaucratic structures with a traditional willingness and readiness, are dead set against conceding an iota of their own interests. One could say each republic is grabbing what it can mindless of what might ensure. The documents signed in Minsk on December 30 display a streamlined inefficiency. Meanwhile differences deepen. The initial Belovezhskaya declarations have already been amended time and again, all in favour of the egocentrism of the different republics.

Two prognostications have been advanced as regards the CIS's future. The first is that the CIS represents a civilized means of separating the erstwhile Union's erstwhile republics. Though this is now a free marriage, the parties keep turning their eyes away from one another, even though by virtue of their perennial muddled relationship and a realized necessity they need to conduct business in common. The second forecast is that the CIS is a transitory phase towards a restored empire centre and it is this that haunts the independent parliaments, inducing them, when ratifying the respective documents to erase even a hint of "empire building." Yet there is still one more Commonwealth concept which is most likely detached from life and which reveals the semblance of radiant illusory hopes. In other words, some theoreticians believed the Commonwealth would hopefully generate a novel, even unprecedented, quality as regards the coexistence and cooperation of independent states, that would induce the entire world to sit up and admire. What ivory-tower dreams!

It goes without saying that the republics may do what they please, even to the point of damaging their own interests. They do not owe anything to anyone. However, not for nothing is it said that individual freedom ends where a neighbour's freedom begins. Actually independence is the realized extent of dependence on others.

Dividing army officers

I would not be surprised were the latest Minsk get-together to cause analysts to note that just as the peoples of the former USSR are badly prepared to embrace democracy, so are whole republics as badly prepared for civilized cooperation. It must be understood that neither can be conjured up out of thin air by the wave of the magic wand. Obviously, the CIS represents that very contradictory, at times inconsistent way, which will be productive only in the long term, to cooperation and – why not? – common prosperity. Basic here is that this is a way which nobody is imposing but which, on the other hand, serves to acquire experience, which again is not imposed by anyone. In short, it offers the chance of lying on the bed one makes oneself, which is greatly to be prized.

Today the republics plainly gloat over their independence. They feel "deeply gratified" that the Centre has gone. Yet, they have still to feel the bitterness of the responsibility they bear for everything taking place within their own confines and, too, the impossibility of blaming the Kremlin. The sole exception I see here is Georgia, whose politicians, having made it independent, are currently settling quarrels by force of arms, realizing that they have only themselves to count upon. It is up to them whether this will be a bloodbath or a national consensus achieved via compromise and thorny negotiations.

At the outset the Belovezhskaya accords delighted all by their two basic attainments – a preserved monetary expanse and a preserved military expanse. By now though we see that the triumphant fanfare was premature as both dimensions are fluid. Thus the Ukraine is introducing food coupons, while Byelorussia is getting ready to follow suit. More than one republic has commissioned foreign printers for their own currency notes. The Russian leadership is also planning its own currency and market protectionism. Incidentally, in this respect the transparency of the frontiers that Yeltsin mentioned, becomes rather blurred, as customs barriers will evidently come into existence. According to one of Yeltsin's latest edicts, a 300 percent fine accruing to the exchequer, will be imposed on businessmen for unlicensed exports from the Russian Federation. Does not this remind you of the old pattern of erecting obstacles that are to be subsequently selflessly surmounted?

It was stated that the nuclear strategic army, Air Force and Navy would stay incorporated in a joint armed force. For long the nuclear button hung suspended in mid-air until it eventually landed in the hands of Russia's President. Western insistence doubtlessly contributed, with Baker persuading even the most independent. However, it seems that the Navy will have to be split up, which relates not only to the equipment, but even to the men, as if they were slaves apportioned out to the different republics. As a result that Soviet Army officer, who was traditionally transferred every couple of years or so from taiga to the southern borders, or from Eastern Europe to Chukotka, may wake up one fine morning to learn that he is serving in the national army for instance, of Azerbaijan. Which means he has every right to reproach our politicians for their presumptuous behaviour, if not for total incompetence. The pull-out from Eastern Europe

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

has taught our policians nothing. Are we not sowing a whirlwind?

Common interests

The erstwhile Union republics are at sixes and sevens. While in Russia the Russian Communist Party and CPSU are banned in Tajikistan its Communist Party was recently reinstated. In Uzbekistan the accused in the sensational "cotton affair" have been released. The case against Adylov, wearer of the Gold Star of Hero of Socialist Labour and chairman of a collective farm, who was charged with corruption and abuse of power, has come up for revision. The Central Asian republics claim that for the meantime conditions for privatization are not ripe. It is high time to look the truth square in the eye and note that over the foreseeable future the erstwhile USSR republics will differ and rather greatly so in the political sense. It is quite possible that the Commonwealth will came to be comprised of Communist dictatorships, parliamentary, presidential and Islamic republics, and authoritarian regimes. Indeed, before they joined hands in 1922, the different republics had traversed different roads, which is bound to show up nowadays when Father Time has swept away every "superstructure" imposed during the past seventy years. Consequently, that full independence which the leaders of the CIS republics never tire of emphasizing, will serve to intensify political differences. Thus far the obstinacy with which they want to "do their own thing" is overriding the realization that it is necessary to hob-nob with one another. Will this leave at least some chance of civilized cooperation? Rather does it pave the way for a heterogeneous uneven community. We already see this happening, inasmuch as the Commonwealth documents merely note "common interests" that do not appear to be mandatory.

While the Commonwealth still has no agencies of its own, indeed while it is still hard to say what agencies it actually needs, scarcely will it be able to effectively influence the external and internal policies of the member states, even though the joint declaration provides for a coordinated foreign policy. The republics are now full masters in their own homes – which in some cases will not be conducive towards inner stability. Their problems are their own affairs, into which no other party may interfere. Thus, Karabakh is Azerbaijan's prerogative, while the Dniester Region is Moldova's own lookout. And on it goes. Before the Centre implied at least a faint chance for the national minorities in the republics. Today that hope no longer exists. Earlier, in the event of interethnic or internal political conflicts, the republics could appeal to the Centre. Today the Centre has gone and will doubtedlessly never come back. Recall the blood-spilling interethnic clashes of the *perestroika* years as in Sumgait, Ferghana and Osh... Who can guarantee safety today? As yet no one has answered that question. On the other hand, we cannot rule out likely repetitions.

At the outset the republics are happy to see that their hands are untied and that there is nobody to prevent them from introducing law and order at discretion. Yet it must be understood that a civilized solution to internal issues is now exclusively **their own** difficult task. Should they come up with the wrong solution, they will undermine inner stability and keep bleeding historic affronts, which as life shows are never forgotten and which from time to time recur on the political scene. Then a wrong solution may greatly undermine the image this or that country presents to the world.

All one can say is that the republics are currently cocooned in a blissful state of egocentric infancy. Let us not reproach them for that. Rather let us feel compassion. They will soon grow out of these swaddling clothes. I think more compassion should be felt for us, as the erstwhile population of the erstwhile USSR...

The Georgian Military Council, which the leaders of the opposition storming Government House have formed, has proclaimed Zviad Gamsakhurdia usurper and dictator. In a tit-for-tat exchange, Georgia's President called his opponents a junta. The opposition introduced a curfew. In turn Gamsakhurdia called for a general mobilization. A classic case of dual power that may trigger off a civil war. All that can save Georgia from full-scale internecine strife nowadays is either the indifferent attitude of the population – which the residents of Tbilisi graphically demonstrated during the fighting around Government House, then neither the curfew nor the mobilization appeal will serve to split Georgia's society down the middle into supporters and adversaries of Gamsakhurdia, or common sense on the part of the republic's policymakers – even though hopes of such prudence are dwindling daily.

What does the opposition have to offer apart from Gamsakhurdia's ouster? And what does the President himself hope for?

Alexander Sokolov,
Board Member,
Memorial Human Rights Centre

The fighting around Government House in Tbilisi continues. The counterattacks Gamsakhurdia's men mount from time to time deal sensitive blows at the rebels. Serious damage is also inflicted by Gamsakhurdia's snipers and the marksmen General Dudayev sent. Throughout Tbilisi the President's active supporters number no more than some 10,000 or so, and thus far the attempts by one or another group to break through are checked. Most local residents worry more about the freeing of prices in the Russian Federation, which cannot but alter Georgia's economic set-up.

The gunmen

The President insists that his only opposition is in Parliament, that there is no opposition outside Parliament. Over the past six months or so, he has claimed that his opponents are not in the opposition, but from the criminal underworld. Before, depending on the obtaining circumstances, he called them agents of Abkhazia, Ossetia and Turkey, but otherwise "agents of the Kremlin." That a powerful opposition exists outside Parliament derives from some political parties having boycotted the elections which were held yet during the Communist regime.

The hour of the opposition

Rebel leaders have disconnected all communications, inclusive of telephone, sound and TV broadcasting and satellite transmission. Locals gain wind of yesterday's news in roundabout ways. Indeed, it has already been rumoured that the President has fled or died. The last is quite possible, as the political opposition has nicknamed Gamsakhurdia a second Ceausescu.

Though the political opposition, which has been mostly behind resistance to the Gamsakhurdia regime, and which last September demanded that he resign, officially declares allegiance to an exclusively peaceful solution, it does not attempt to hide its sympathies for the mutineers.

There is no unity in the opposition camp. Besides the run-of-the-mill political sixes and sevens amongst its fifty or so parties, between the radicals of the alternative National Congress parliament and the moderates not in this parliament, two serious divisions are noticeable. Opposition political parties are reluctant to take over by means of outright violence, as they do not want to trigger off a sequence of military takeovers. Moreover, in the event of a successful takeover it will be impossible, to all practical intents, to disarm Kitovani's guardsmen, to pull them out of his, Kitovani's control. It was these considerations that in September induced the political opposition to shy from a straightforward alliance with the rebelling guardsmen. Which is doubtlessly a thorn in the side of Kitovani, who has staked his all on the outcome.

The second contradiction is of a political nature. The National Congress opposition has always been dead set against Georgia's inclusion in the USSR. Indeed, all its major parties are led by former Georgian dissidents, who having served prison terms under the Communist regime, have acquired a legendary fame. They include Tamriko Chkheidze, hailed in the early 1980s as the Joan of Arc of the Georgian liberation movement, Georgi Chanturia, who was permanently confined to the punishment block for declining to spring to attention whenever a Gulag chief passed by, and youth leader Irakli Tsereteli. They all maintain that Gamsakhurdia has sold out national independence and seeks to keep Georgia within the Soviet empire. For them to go back on the ideas for which they suffered is most painful, even though their closest friends admit that Georgia's economy is in ruins today and depends exclusively on its northern neighbour. As it is near suicidal to gain independence without Russia's backing, the next step is necessarily to conclude an economic alliance with its norther neighbour.

Fourth force neutral so far

The radical political opposition regarded the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the attendance of Georgia's official observers at the related talks as a prelude to unveiled entry into the revived Union. Zviad Gamsakhurdia's efforts during the fighting to barter consent to the CIS involvement for military assistance from the erstwhile Union has merely served to reaffirm the old attitude to the President as the man who sold out the national movement.

For Tenghiz Sigua, a professional economist and former Prime Minister, who is now closely allied with Kitovani, each new day of Georgia's self-isolation strikes one more blow at its economy. Which is why he takes a more positive view of the CIS.

Recent days have seen the emergence of more factors serving to strengthen the political opposition. The "lawful" release of Georgy Chanturia and other political prisoners by the governors of the interrogation prison of the former KGB, provides the opposition with more leeway for independent action. Meanwhile Djaba Ioseliani, leader of the quasi-military Mkhedrioni organization, which Gamsakhurdia and the Soviet Army crushed, who was released along with Chanturia is simply dying to have Gamsakhurdia incarcerated in the prison cell to which he had been confined. With his supporters, he represents a counterbalance to Kitovani's "scarlet berets."

Tbilisi's fourth force, which has thus far not intervened, are the troops of the Transcaucasian Military Region. All four years thus far, it has been under fire from the national movement. Servicemen's families have been assaulted while army officers feared to appear in uniform. Radical oppositionists have been conducting endless meetings and rallies outside military compounds. Yet Gamsakhurdia appealed to the army to help him fight his opponents, though demanding that it withdraw only form the theatre of the Georigan-Ossetian conflict. True, the armed forces have no particular liking for Gamsakhurdia. For the time being they have stayed neutral, unwilling to be involved in the fighting, even though servicemen continue to be assaulted in Tbilisi neighbourhoods, some are injured, while some groups seek to capture their weapons. However, there is a limit to their patience and as one army officer put it, the Region's HQ has discussed the option of armed intervention. True, we do not know whose side the army may take. It is quite likely that the question was not decided. Anyway both sides have asked the Russian leadership for help.

s hostilities continue, the President's supporters dwindle

Prices are free. Freedom is priceless

The reforms announced several years ago have at last got off on to a start. Thus far the consumer feels nothing

January 2 was awaited with apprehension, hope and curiosity. What would it bring? Some economists categorically refused to make any forecasts and perform variations on the respective theme seeing this as an equation with too many unknowns. Some recalled that in the starving, ruined country shops were bursting at the seams on the very next day after NEP, the New Economic Policy, was announced. Sundry rumours were afloat that shop storage rooms were packed while enterprises had full warehouses all in expectation of the long-awaited free prices. Russia's first Vice-Premier alleged during the first few months people would tour shops, as if they were museums and exhibition rooms. The population seemed ready to do so, at least to feast the eyes, but... nothing of the sort happened.

In short, the formula that "they woke up the next day to find shops full but prices sky high" did not come off. Shelves were still bare. It is quite possible that even for the government this came as a revelation. Now its job and that of its economists is to furnish the explanation. True, it is obvious. Where are we to obtain abundance from in conditions of free prices when production is falling? While there are still no incentives for producers to invest and acquire property, our businessmen's paramount concern will still be to grab as much as they can, while they can get away with it. While there is still no proper tax system and tax inspectorate, while there are still no bankruptcy procedures and control of fiscal emission, our enterprises will find it more advantageous to produce for a select elite, implying people able to pay 1,500 rubles for a kilo of ham and 6,000 rubles for ladies' highboots.

On January 2 we woke up to realize that free prices are merely a completely unbacked protocol of intent, a token of the market economy, for some a nightmare, for others long expected. On January 2 we woke up to realize that free prices are priceless like every freedom, even when the conditions are not there for its implementation. Therein evidently the basic implication of the Russian government's so long postponed move. In this country of ours free prices are an intellectual, not commercial, concept. At least for the time being.

What will the future bring? No Russian minister has thus far come up with an answer. Could Western economists be more knowledgeable? We asked three reputable economists from the lands of "long victorious capitalism" to air their views.



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

VIEWS OF FOREIGN EXPERTS

Blow at the "distributive" mafia

Emilio Ontiveros, Chief expert of the Autonomous Madrid University and expert of the privately owned International Financial Analysts research team (Spain).

The freeing of prices in Russia is a major move towards a market economy. However, it should be understood that its consequences may be most contradictory, should it not be attended by other reforms concerned primarily with the reorganization of production. In other words, unless backed up by venues for competition in production and distribution, the freeing of prices may generate nothing more than galloping inflation and accordingly more price hikes.

The foreseeable future evidently implies the following scenario:

1. A jump in prices which is only logical.

2. Unless consumer incomes grow and there is more goods in the shops, it will be harder and harder to avoid aggravation of already existing social tensions.

3. The gradual exit of the "distributive" mafia sponging on the difference between state and market prices would be conducive.

In the long term negative consequences may ensue due to unsynchronized economic liberalization in each independent CIS member state, firstly Russia and the Ukraine. It is quite possible that the ruble, as the common currency for the new Commonwealth, will come under growing fire. In addition, Moscow and Kiev may increasingly debate the considerable differences in prices and rates for identical commodities and services. Which may all occur within the context of Kravchuk's intentions to oppose price hikes in the Ukraine initially by coupons and subsequently, by the emission of national currency.

In the upshot Russia's higher prices will spur Ukrainians to export commodities and food to Russia. True, to this end they will need to somehow get around border customs controls.



Two years to wait?

Dr. *Eberhard Schneider,* Federal Institute for Eastern Europe and International Studies (Germany):

The freeing of prices will cause them to rapidly double and treble, which incidentally will be only natural. Food and goods will appear, but not much. Social tensions will erupt despite promised controlled prices on some staples. The segment of the population already living below the cost-of-living minimum will be beggared.

It is essential for pay to be raised in the wake of rising prices, as in the final analysis it is vital to pay everyone what he or she really earns – which basically is what Yeltsin's reform implies. People will continue to address all claims to the state, demanding that it provide them with this and guarantee them that. I would not rule out a demonstration outside Russia's White House calling for Yeltsin's resignation.

We already hear it said that the promise to remedy the situation by the autumn of 1992 is unrealistic. If everything proceeds as plan-

ned, we may expect tangible improvements in a couple of years. However, it is this period that will be politically dangerous. Unless minimal food supplies are ensured, especially in the bigger cities, we may expect rioting, which certain political forces will try to capitalize upon. They will not stage a new putsch, but will simply bide until the time is ripe.

"Big bang"

Daniel Tarchys, Chairman, of the Swedish Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, and expert on market and state finances problems (Sweden):

In the CIS republics prices should have been freed long ago. While they were artificially depressed, the economy could not function normally. True, Western experts were astonished to learn that reform details had been announced long in advance. In the upshot goods were simply held back in hopes of increased profit from sales under the new prices.

The price decision is no panacea. Other measures are urgently called for. Thus it is essential to bridge the state budgetary deficit and balance monetary circulation. With the passage of time people will come to understand that it is not the government now that sets prices, but that prices depend on supply and demand. Prices go up or down out of no fault of the government, but depending on the state of the national economy. Poland also had its "big bang," when prices were unpegged. However, this was followed by conducive changes in the economy, though true not all the relevant expectations materialized.

To make things clear, let met emphasize the basic factor which is that Russia has not got the money to subsidize depressed prices. No matter whoever is at the top today, the state budget would crash were the attempt made to prolong the agony of the old price system, which erupted a year or two ago. The main thing today is to provide life-giving incentives for minor market subjects as was done in Poland, since this would drastically amplify business activity. The difficulties with which Russia is faced, such as the inordinate centralization of the economic ties, gigantism and monopolism are obvious. Consequently, it would be essential to fragment both trade and industry, if not forcibly split up the big associations and trusts currently teetering on the brink of collapse.

In external trade export operations would become more flexible and imports would change with more vital consumer commodities purchased. However, still unsettled is that crucial issue of the system of payments and other dealings with foreign partners. Currently the solvency of the republics of the former USSR is virtually nil, while their hard currency resources are exhausted. Rebuilding an effective system of payments is a task for both the new republican authorities and the West whom it behooves to render serious assistance. At the present stage it would be most likely sensible for the West to focus on the three trends of the provision of knowhow, humanitarian aid, and cooperation in organizing normal external commerce.

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

Prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi poll

New and uncommon

What mainly impedes private enterprise (in proportion to the total polled)?

1. The unpreparedness and inability to engage in what is new and uncommon.
2. The absence of material facilities for private enterprise.
3. The absence of legislation guaranteeing entrepreneurs the proper rights and protection.
4. The indecisiveness and conservatism of local authorities.
5. Sabotage by top state officials.
6. A mass reluctance to give up habitual, traditional lifestyles.
7. Envy, racketeering, and menacing of entrepreneurs.
8. Do not know.

The results of a representative polling of 1,995 Russian Federation residents, conducted at the close of the previous year, provide some notion of the actual difficulties facing our society in the process of economic reform. Obviously, basic is the unpreparedness, plus the unwillingness of the masses to take the road Russia's leaders propose.

In mid-1991, when public-opinion makers called for economic reform, our Vox Populi service noted this factor's paramount significance. Is the government drawing any conclusions therefrom? Is it necessarily amending the strategy for implementing its programmes? Nowadays this is crucial.



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Zombi & Co

(from a collection of detective stories)

There is something symbolic in that all of them crowded on the porch of the Lenin Museum as if on a parvis, although their attitude towards the guardian deity of this revolutionary temple does not at times resemble anything like devotion.

Newspapers and leaflets of the most diverse trends are heaped up on the granite peristyle of the former Moscow City Duma (Council). The wind tousles the paper while the salesmen industriously attend to their business on the improvized counters of stone.

It is Saturday, and the people hurrying to the nearest Metro station crowd the premises. Everybody is eager to see with his own eyes how the defence of the "Red House" so much talked of on TV is going on, and how volunteers are enlisted for participation in the "Lenin Line," and the pickets (even now there are some who flourish their home-made placards), and the gathering of donations; some would like to listen to political discussions and find out what sort of merchandise is offered from the stone parapet. The majority of them are tired, feel lost and bedevilled after futile searches through empty shops. They want to understand how all that has happened, how the country has been driven to such a deplorable state? They want an answer, and they are offered it, ready-made and simple, like the lucky ticket drawn by a parrot in the mess of a noisy market-place. A "holy place" and a bazaar at a time.

And people buy. The packs of newspapers quickly vanish. Each salesman sells his own merchandise, but all of them serve inconspicuously one common cause. Even the titles of the publications have, surprisingly, something in common – *Nasha Rossiya* (Our Russia), *Russki Vestnik* (Russian Messenger), *Den* (Day), *Molniya* (Lightning), *Shto Delat?* (What to Do?), *Politika* (Politics)...

To taste a wine, no need to consume a barrel, as the proverb has it. I will confine myself to only one topic, only one event which has gathered this motley newspaper crew of the last Lenin's convocation on the footsteps of the museum porch.

This is the August putsch, the wreckage, the survivors of which managed to reach the island near the Red Square. The unusual bureaucratically vaudeville nature of the putsch, of these convultions of the agonizing Bolshevik regime became the topic of incessant disputes in the press which acquired a particularly histerical and hectic character.

The result of the abortive coup is well known – the partocratic system of the CPSU has been crushed and the former Soviet Union has ceased to exist. The real impact of the three August days will be more than once weighed on the balance of history. But what kind of picture of this historical turnover presents itself to the imagination of the wrecked? It's precisely here that a real detective story begins, partly fostered by the lack of information prior to the trial and the mysterious nature of certain events and the role of certain key figures, and to a still greater degree fed by the hectic fantasy of journalists.

We are made to believe that there was no attempt of a reactionary coup, that there was a brilliantly accomplished provocation comparable only to the arson of the Reichstag in 1933. The whole affair was allegedly a masterfully directed "performance a priori designed to be a failure." The so-called democrats, covering themselves with talks about the fake "putsch," staged a real coup d'état to seize power. A comparatively ambiguous article treating of the matter was placed by the daily *Politika* published by the parliamentary faction Soyuz (Union). The same subject was pathetically and wrathfully discussed by the well-known general Makashov in the orthodoxically communist *Nasha Rossiya* (Our Russia; No 17, 1991.)

Having noted the low professional qualities of the leaders, A.Makashov rebukes them in the following way: "The leaders of the CPSU, the army and public organizations of country-wide repute were left aside in the course of the coup... Personally I could not get in touch with Yazov during those three days whereas, if the coup had been a genuine one, he would himself have found the obstinate and restless Makashov."

The baton on the pages of the said paper was taken over by the *Pravda's* own correspondent A.Golovenko. His interview was headed "The masterful provocation: cui bono?" The answer can be reduced to the well-known phraseology about Boris Yeltsin as a legal representative of our "avaricious, 'barbarous,' West-oriented home-baked bourgeoisie;" the real pathos of this publication consists in developing the detective plot still further.

The State Emergency Committee members are pictured here not merely as unskilled professionals and half-baked plotters, but as good guys who need "protection... against all the filth slung at them on no grounds," for they "didn't in fact initiate a single action..." Of course, there were tanks in the Moscow streets, and not dummy ones, yet they didn't fire at the people, while the noble conspirators, although they had imposed a curfew, "afforded opportunity to hold rallies directed... against themselves" – just sacrificial lambs going to the immolation for the sake of an unknown transcendental purpose! A dozen of nomenclature kamikazes who selflessly decided to change their governmental chairs and countryside residences for crowded cells in jail!

However, the veil of inexplicable mystery covering the detective plot was lifted by A.Maratov in his article *A putsch after the Agatha Christie fashion?* – the scenario of the "fake putsch" had been worked out by "overseas authors" beyond steel-plated doors and "precisely after the Agatha Christie fashion." As is well-known, the turns of plot in this celebrated novellist's books are so sophisticated that the credulous reader is fooled till the last page. She skilfully sets the nets of clues around the supposed offender, which results in that "everything turns out to be absolutely different, and the culprit is **a quite unexpected person.**"The August putsch was a political farce in three acts of exactly this sort.

To quote: "So, what was the script of the 'putsch' like?" The provocateur Kryuchkov, by the orders from his superiors, was to instigate creation and functioning of the State Emergency Committee. The plan worked. The inexperienced 'Putschists' were expected to make a number of blunders and fail. This worked too... The suppression of the 'putsch' was to result in the dissolving of the CPSU, the dismantling of the USSR, replacement of the Cabinet of Ministers..." and so on. "Well done."

However, the evil-minded seducer, alias "professional agent-provocateur" Kryuchkov as such is no more than a pawn. He is directed by a bigger boss whose identity is no enigma to anyone. Act II of the script is that the role of "Mikhail Gorbachev as the director of the August farce" is revealed (and subsequently confirmed) by means of publications in the press and speeches made by parliamentarians. Finally, there comes the third and concluding act: replacement



Zombi & Co on the war path again *Photo TASS*

of Gorbachev by another leader who would "still more energetically continue Gorbachev's cause of converting the USSR into western semi-colony without being even formally committed by the oaths of fidelity to the socialist option." And if the true Marxists-Leninists don't in time unveil this diabolic intrigue the American Uncle Sam (who is also the super-boss and the author of the above scenario) will have all reasons for triumphant joy.

The best of lies is woven of partial truths. The trial will throw light on all details of the August events. However, the authors of this detective story are least of all concerned about the truth. Theirs is a set of a priori formulated versions easily discernible on the pages of practically all publications obtainable from the press dealers who have occupied the parvis of the museum-temple.

The ominous "Sonderkommanden," the elusive organizers of a series of mysterious suicides (Pugo, Kruchina, Akhromeyev), deaths and bandit-type assaults (the collective shooting of the Medininkai customs officers in Lithuania and others) to provoke the power-thirsty "democrats" in August – one can read about all that not only in the paper *Nasha Rossiya,* but also in the "national-patriotic" weekly *Russky Vestnik* (No. 22, 1991).

While the *Russky Vestnik* published in its issue No 20 the letter of one of the arrested putschist leaders, V.Starodubtsev, under the title "I had nothing to do with the putsch," a literary newspaper *Den* (No. 22) spiritually very much akin to the above-mentioned periodical, published a collection of verses by the "illegally detained and captive" (to quote the introduction to the collection) poet A.Lukyanov-Osenev... Innocent poets in the hands of assassins!

The elaborate detective plot in the fashion of Agatha Cristie might be impeccable if not for an obvious oversight – the absence of one of the dramatis personae, absolutely unnecessary in the exquisite and somewhat hermetically sealed world of the lady-novellist. However, this personage is to be reckoned with in the bureaucratic cabinets. This personage is the people, tens and hundreds of thousands of people, the crowds in the streets which, in fact, defeated the putschists. What to do about them?

Don't worry! There are specialists to tackle the problem. For instance, "the paper of the working class movement" *Molniya* and "the all-Union periodical of the United Labour Front" *Shto Delat?* . Their joint issue No 26 is a valuable contribution to the collective elaboration of this detective story's plot.

Their publication is entitled *Zombies near the Russian White House.* This is an interview with a certain Doctor of Philosophy, lecturer in the Moscow Pedagogical Institute, Bulgarian by birth, Todor Dichev who has recently declared at an important international meeting that "in the period of August 19–23 this year the defenders of the Russian White House were 'zombiized,' i.e. were victims of a psychological subversion."

A few words about the terms which seem to have emerged from the sphere of the science fiction. A zombi is a person completely deprived of his own free will and living and acting under the influence of a programme externally imposed upon him. It has also turned out that there are psychotronic generators "capable of programming people." Dichev insists that "precisely such contrivance was on board the American cruiser 'Belknap' which left the Varna port on August 18–19. From board the ship a psychological influence was directed at the Muscovites. An appliance of the same kind was operating in Moscow during the famous speech Boris Yeltsin made from the top of a personnel carrier.

Thus, as it turns out, the putsch was thwarted by many thousand-strong crowds of artificially created maniacs scientifically known as "zombies." Dichev and the staff of the newspapers published by the Working Class Movement and the United Labour Front know perfectly well also those who directed actions of the American Uncle Sam aiming the expensive equipment at Moscow. It is "the union of the world Zionism, Pan-Americanism and Pan-Germanism, as well as the religious union of Judaism, Catholicism and Pan-Turkism. They are together most dangerous to us, slavs."

In short, the circle is complete. On the porch of the Lenin Museum orthodox communists openly fraternize with "national patriots."

They try to entice the people and tame the minds by means of cheap ideological stuff, and with the indefatigable hope for a totalitarian revenge.

Zombi & Co are embarking on an new crusade.

Yuri Oklyansky

The Russian dilemma

One specifically Russian dilemma has always been in the background of all the storms that have tormented Russia, of all vociferous disputes at times reminiscent of a demoniac call-over, of all the choices and options Russia and Russians have had to make

Konstantin Pleshakov

Disputes over despotism, the limits of freedom, personal sovereignty, and social doctrines have raged equally in all countries, from Terra del Fuego to the shores of the Arctic Ocean, but there always has been one specifically Russian problem – who are we, East or West? A nice question to be asked by an enormous country which first spread from the limits of the West to the bounds of the East to fill the black hole of Eurasia and only then began to think the situation over.

Asia or Europe?

Rus began to form on an absolute periphery equally remote from both European and Asian centres of civilization, in places unsuitable for the development of great civilizations. In the years of its ethnic infancy the question of its origin did not arise; subsequently it was decided, however, that we originated from Byzantium. Indeed, Byzantium whose civilization had by that time reached its climax, shared with Russia the basic principles of existence – from religion which formed the universal frame of concepts to the principles of statehood. Evidently the East-West dilemma would have later arisen for Byzantium too, since the latter was an "Asianized" piece of the West. Byzantium, however, was connected with Europe by "family ties," while Russia for many centuries – till the coming of Peter the Great – remained isolated from both European and Asian centres of civilization – by a chain of hostile countries in the north, west and south and the God-foresaken Asian expances in the east. It was only natural to assume subsequently that it was thanks to this isolation that Russia had developed absolutely specific and independent civilizational features.

Peter the Great solved the Russian dilemma in accordance with his unique psyche, that of an eternal adolescence: we are an underdeveloped Europe, therefore I order us to be regarded as Europeans. The dispute started early in the last century when Russia entered the period of its spiritual maturity and it continues to this day.

Many have tried to solve the Russian dilemma categorically in favour of the West. But why is it so tragically different from Europe?

Others favoured the Asiatic option: "We are the Scythians! We are the slit-eyed Asians!" Inasmuch as Christianity is an Oriental religion, Russia is Oriental too, however the argument hardly goes any further.

There has also been another solution – Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but something specific, a "third path," a civilization in its own right. The latter solution is an attractive and flattering yet hardly correct one, for Russia, for all its specificity, is an heir to Byzantium which, although "Asianized," remained Rome's sister. What is obvious beyond all doubt is the role Russia played as an intermediary between East and West, as a cordon sanitaire, both geopolitical and spiritual. It's hardly by accident that Roerich was born in Russia.

Russia's emperial existence has led to its borders being different from what they used to be in the middle of last century, different not so much politically (which is easily reparable, as the independent republics say today,and they may be trusted) as ethnically.

Russia used to expand from Moscow in all directions annexing lands – at times its own, at times alien ones and sometimes no man's land. Russians used to come and stay, and today they inhabit places where formerly they were not even heard of. This changed Russia. Russians infiltrated other cultures, retaining as a rule their identity, but sometimes they remolded into something new which even had no special name. How, for instance, should the residents of the former New Russia, the Slobodskaya Ukraine, Odessa, Nikolayev, Sevastopol and Donetsk be referred to?

Russia reached the Pacific and the northernmost limits of the East, it settled Siberia and became an Asian power. This expansion was a forced phenomenon – the Empire was not allowed to advance where it wanted – to Constantinople, in order to fix the Cross over the Agia Sopia and regain its Bysantine dowery. Whereas the Americans deemed the Coast a promised land (which it did turn out later), the eastward advance of Russians through Siberia to the Pacific was similar to a flight of moths which struck against a bright closed window and had to fly into the night because this was the only direction available

Drawing by Pavel Bunin

to them. However, Russia's eastern bounds retained no trace of the East, for the great civilizations of the East had not reached that far while the scarce autochthons could be ignored as far as civilization is concerned.

It might seem that Russia could have been influenced by its coexistence, within the bounds of the Empire, with the Moslem Orient. However, Russia's inherent characteristic of avoiding by all means the prospect of becoming a "melting pot" of peoples and civilizations (unlike the United States) manifested itself here. Russians could migrate to the East, they could Russify it superficially without affecting the underlying local structures, but Russia didn't want to be melted in one pot with it, which means that it simply couldn't, since the language of history possesses no word for "wish." Why, for a hundred-odd years, has nothing like a "melting pot" appeared? Why weren't even Russians in Central Asia affected by contacts, not to mention the main mass of them? What was the reason for that – imperial contemptuousness or something else? In any case, the coexistence of Russia and the vast world of Islam within common boundaries for more than a hundred years has failed to produce any effect. Russia mixed with the East as water does with oil.

Instead of fusion there was mutual repulsion accompanied by the forming of negative ethnic stereotypes.

As we remember, some already long ago solved the Russian dilemma by insisting that Russia is neither East nor West, but a kind of the hird path of civilization. However, Black Africa did not want to join the West either nor had it anything to do with the East, consequently, it also could lay claims to specificity...

And yet there have been attempts to impose upon Russia a specific path of civilization. When the Bolsheviks came to power they declared, in full conformity with the the doctrine professed by the two great revolutionary classics, that they were going to build a civilization of their own, universal and different from both the backward East and the decaying West. The universal international Bolshelvik empire spared no effort to defend its civilization; but as soon as it collapsed everybody began to speak his or her ethnic language with a sigh of relief. But have the efforts of the Bolsheviks really been so futile? Political scientists and psychologists agree that there has appeared a new and highly resistant parasitical form of life called Homo Soveticus. Will Russia be replaced by a new world – Pax Sovetica? While practically all regimes which have arisen on the territory of the former Soviet Union have in varying degree retained some of the ugly Soviet features, it's not so as far as civilization is concerned. When the empire began to shatter early in the sixties there started a process of regaining former ethnic identity.

As a result, Russia, having gone through the period of Bolshevik civilization, is again faced with its traditional dilemma, and its present search for civilizational identity is aggravated by the crisis; even the flavour of freedom does not remove the bitter taste of the past.

However, it is precisely this most profound crisis that has rendered the problem of Russia's identity as a civilization so acute. This is explained by the necessity to fulfil a number of practical tasks. What must be Russia's stance in regard to the Moslem enclaves on its territory? Relations with which of the sister republics take priority today? Where can more success be expected – in the East (Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, Taiwan, ASEAN) or in the West (USA, Germany, Great Britain, France)? Which direction to choose?

Whither, in fact?

Today that part of the East which has become part of Russia, in the course of its thousand year-long history, rises against it, and it appears to have remained alien from it; both the North Caucasus which was hastily attached to Russia in the middle of last century and Tataria which was attached to Russia under Ivan the Terrible four centuries ago and whose capital Kazan has been one of the centres of Russian enterprise and science. Up to this day Russia and the East have spoken absolutely different languages.

As for the sister republics, positions become particularly irreconcilable when the question of Russia's foreign policy is touched upon. The main issue here, which still remains unsettled, is whether Russia as a civilization embraces only the Russian Federation or it also includes the Ukraine and Byelorussia? In terms of civilization the latter seems more logical; politically, we will speak of Russia as the Russian Federation. Proceeding from the interpretation of Russia as a bridge between the East and the West, we arrive at the idea of the indisputable importance of Moslem Central Asia. A bridge reaching as far as East Asia, China, Japan and Korea can't stand without its nearest piers. Actually, the role of an economic and political bridge is somewhat dubious. Why a wooden and unreliable bridge between the West and Japan or Korea when they are already connected by an electronic one? Wouldn't it be more correct to say that Russia's traditional place is in Europe and, consequently, that the priority today lies with the Ukraine and Byelorussia? Will Russia be able to remain a great power without preserving common identity with them? Most probably – no. And it is not a matter of on economic vacuum here, for it will be filled by, for instance, the Ukraine in the process of inevitable economic cooperation. The Ukraine has no other sufficiently large market except Russia, and any dreams about a triumphant conquest of foreign markets will remain a pipe dream in the case of all republics, including Russia. Besides, the Ukraine itself greatly depends economically on Russia. But from the geopolitical and civilizational points of view, the absence of close special union relations with Byelorussia and especially the Ukraine may result in a complete loss of identity by Russia and, possibly, by these republics too.

In the absence of special relations with the Ukraine, Russia will be again cut off from Europe. The geopolitical and civilizational problems of the 17–18th centuries are reviving. It is not a great task to predict how they will be solved ,by militant nationalism which in that scenario would have good chances of becoming Russia's new scourge. It would be catastrophic for the situation in Eurasia as a whole, not to mention Russia and the Ukraine. All of which lends support to the unquestionable superiority of the European orientation.

It makes absolutely no sense to discuss the question of where to look for economic aid – in the East or in the West; cultural identity is of no importance in the present desperate situation. Aid will be received by all republics from whoever will be willing to extend it – Madagascar included.

The question of Russia's geopolitical orientation following the overcoming of the crisis remains an open one. It is not ruled out that the Russian dilemma will be in a way removed by the planetary civilizational current, bringing West and East closer. In the conditions of this integration, it would be naive to expect that Russia will throw its identity on the scale of the West-East balance; its mediatory function will lie precisely in the main stream of the civilizational current uniting the world. The role that Russia has for ages tried to perform, consciously or otherwise – the mediatory function between the East and the West will become an important instrument of Eurasian cultural integration. It is possible that the eternal Russian dualism will thus be overcome, and what has seemed to be a painful and rather futile search for one's civilizational identity will turn out to be a process completely corresponding to the planetary vector. The dilemma will disappear, a solution will be found, and this solution will have not only Russian, but also Eurasian significance. ■

POLITICAL FORECAST

The superpower has not passed away yet

Yevgeny Bazhanov

The USSR is no more, but its foreign policy interests remain. What does the future have in store for the heirs to the former superpower?

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics has breathed its last breath. Its institutions have been abolished or restructured, its idols have been toppled or held up to ridicule. For the umpteenth time now, society is trying to start from scratch. Attempts, however, to turn over a new leaf failed in 1917, 1945, 1953, 1964 and 1985. Shall we succeed this time?

Another unique invention by post-Union politicians – the Commonwealth of Independent States – has been announced. Once again, the world is wondering what it means and what will become of it. What does the Commonwealth promise the rest of humankind?

"The outlook is bright, but the path is tortuous"

It looks as if the CIS is not a fiction. For all their pride, eleven, if not twelve, former Socialist Republics will not dare to sever the umbilical cord connecting them to one another. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth is in for trying times.

In the foreseeable future, one-sixth of the globe will be entrapped in ethnic strife, territorial disputes, the squaring up of old accounts, and rivalry over the sharing of the lean national cake. Pandora's box is open and, as the swift and inglorious defeat of the Yanayev-Kryuchkov "State Committee for the State of Emergency" has indicated, it is practically no use trying to slam its lid shut by sheer force. Hopes of promptly getting out of the economic mess we are in are unrealistic, as well. In Russia – be it tsarist or Soviet – the economy has never worked smoothly, and no preconditions have been met for ending this lamentable tradition. In the history of humankind there is no precedent for curing an economy which is in a state of total chaos. People's energy is drained by street meetings, food lines and, what is worse, in fights, which leaves them without any energy left for constructive effort.

The situation wouldn't be half as bad if it were a matter of mere economic inefficiency and food shortages which were causing all equal suffering. But in actuality, as most people are getting poorer, the handful of the newly-rich are actively engaged in the primary accumulation of capital in the "best" traditions of that process described by Charles Dickens and Jack London. For those brought up to swear by the idea of wage-levelling, it won't be easy to put up with the increasing social stratification; the hungery and ragged masses may get unrestful, even violent.

The formation of new political structures is found to be an agonizing process. A no-nonsense struggle for power, privileges and popularity is taking place at practically all levels of the new governmental bodies. The rivals do not shy away from using any means towards their ends – from demagogical attacks on their opponents to attempts at ruining their career.

The path to the formation of an ideological credo for the Commonwealth is going to be a thorny one. Today society has been left without faith, in a spiritual vacuum. A situation like that is by no means unprecedented in both the remote and recent past. Take for instance, Germany after Nazism had collapsed. There the malignant system of government was uprooted by the foreign victors and replaced with an entirely new political system. In the former USSR, the situation is different. It has neither lost a war nor renounced the inheritance of the communist regime (which cannot be abolished overnight, anyway). As a result, we have all but lost our bearings, foreign policy ones included. It is not easy now to distinguish between our friends and mere partners, to tell whether the CIS has any rivals, what was correct and what was wrong about the former USSR's behaviour. In general, as Mao Zedong used to say in the period of "the big leap forward" and "the cultural revolution": "the outlook for our future is bright, but our path is a tortuous one."

Strategic tasks

Naturally, the behaviour of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the world arena will depend on its member states' internal affairs. The coordinating bodies will have to continually reconcile and pacify Commonwealth members and keep



Drawing by Alexander Zudin

The second potential source of conflicts lies in the military sphere. Although Moscow curbs its own ambitions, it has not given up its policy of maintaining a strategic balance with the USA. This is due not only to inertia but to pragmatic considerations as well: nuclear potential remains Russia's – and the CIS's only trump card. If it loses it, no one will reckon with the Commonwealth any longer. Soviet generals are – besides everything else – proud professionals, and they will certainly try to be up to the mark in the military technology race. On the opposite side of the Atlantic, in the Pentagon, there is also cause for suspicion and concern: any step taken by Russia or the Commonwealth as a whole to build up their military might will be of special danger considering the anarchy which reigns in the former nuclear empire.

them from breaking away form the CIS and joining some other centre of force. The objectives of joint foreign policy will not be confined to that. The objectives will also be to purge its dogmatic world outlook and to say goodbye to such notions as class enemies or brothers in class.

We shall have to get rid of the great-power syndrome and, consequently, to pursue our disarmament effort. Obviously, the CIS will curry favour with the world's richer countries and solicit them for aid-money for their former enemy who has now surrendered.

The United States will remain the main partner of the Commonwealth and those of its member states which, though released, still remain in its orbit. This is quite understandable: friendship with the only remaining superpower ought to be cherished. Foreign aid, moral support by the world community, chances of further arms reduction – all this largely depends on good relations with the USA. Besides, Washington can be useful as an arbiter in deciding disputes over the vast expanses of Eurasia.

Once the arch-enemy, the United States is quickly becoming, in the eyes of the CIS's despondent citizens, almost a land of promise, a paradise flowing with milk and honey. The US has a tremendous force of attraction to our people who either settle there or shuttle to and fro, maintaining the appeal of the American image in the Commonwealth. The knots of tensions in the official relations between Moscow and Washington – the last vestiges of the ideological-hegemonistic antagonism of the past decades – are being undone. In Latin America and Africa, there are no remnants of discord at all. In the Middle East, the priorities of the CIS and Washington are quickly drawing closer together. In Western Europe, the only remaining serious problem is the German one, but on this problem too the USA and the CIS are carrying on their dialogue in the common language they have found over the years of *perestroika*. Both sides agree that the reunited Germans should prosper without thinking of revenge.

In Asia, the practice of playing the "Chinese card" has sunk into oblivion. Beijing's ideological and geopolitical interests prompt it to cooperate with the CIS and the USA while keeping its distance from both partners. Moscow has never tried to vie with the United States for influence in the ASEAN countries or in Australia, and the Commonwealth won't even dream of that. Even if the United States spearheads the penetration of Western influence into Mongolia, the CIS will not intervene. It has other fish to fry.

Two potential sources of conflicts can be singled out in the CIS-USA relations. The first is the White House's interference in quarrels between the former constituent parts of the USSR. Latvians, Armenians, Lithuanians and others are tempted to appeal to the United States when clashing with stronger Russia. Will the Americans be always restrained and precise in their responses, will they refrain from intervening and from attempting to bring pressure to bear on Moscow?

Political puzzles

The Commonwealth of Independent States expects Europe to supplement American aid. The new states will solicit all the West European states for aid, including Germans on the assumption that the latter have not yet paid for their reunification in full. Europe does not want chaos in the CIS, therefore aid will be forthcoming. Nevertheless our relationships with Europe will hardly be clear sailing. Our former "comrades-in-arms" in the Warsaw Treaty may prove difficult to deal with. Quite a few mutual claims and complaints have accumulated. New complications will arise in the process of vying for aid from prosperous states and because of two-way migration flows of citizens who are not always law-abiding. Western Europe may well intercede with, say, Minsk or Moscow over the issue of Poles or Romanians "intruders." Frictions may develop over the Baltics. Supposing Latvians or Estonians begin to maltreat local Russians, and the Russian leadership sticks up for the latter so vigorously that the French or Scandinavians may decide to step in to give the weaker side a hand.

If Germany resumes its claims to the territories it has lost, this may create a special and highly explosive problem. In time the sense of gratitude to Moscow for the reunification of Germany will wear off, while resentment over the fact that others are managing – or rather mismanaging –

the lands which once belonged to Germany may rise to the surface.

The Kremlin has cooled off towards Asia somewhat of late. Preoccupied with domestic problems, it is no longer as actively involved with the East as it used to be. However, there is no getting away from Asia either now or, especially, in the future. The CIS's border with China, for instance, is over 7,000 km long. The PRC is apprehensive of evil ideological and nationalistic winds which threaten not only to shake loose the building of Chinese-style socialism but also to raise the whirlwind of separatism and ethnic strife. The CIS ought to tread carefully in its relationships with Beijing, which, in spite of everything, seeks to live in peace with the homeland of Lenin, which has anathemized the leader of the proletariat. Is the Commonwealth's loose multilayer system of government capable of the refined diplomacy called for in this case? What if the democrats and nationalists of every stripe begin to cultivate Chinese dissidents and recalcitrant leaders of national minorities, what if they respond to the courtship by the rich Taiwan seducer? And what if China, for its part, tries to "console" the Central Asian leaders should the latter have a grudge against Moscow? In addition, there are border disputes still to be resolved. The border should be finalized as soon as possible lest anyone in the CIS or the PRC should ever wish to play on such a sensitive issue.

Our territorial dispute with the Japanese is also to be dealt with. A continued rejection of Tokyo's claims to the Kurils will keep open a festering wound which, if Japan carries on its ascent to the heights of scientific, technological and economic progress, and if Russia is doomed to floundering in the morass of a crisis, may cause deadly metastases. Even if events do not take a dramatic turn, the Japanese will never offer us real aid without their territorial claim being satisfied. In that case, the other Asian "dragons" will not invest in the eastern parts of Russia, with the result that Siberia and the Far East will doom themselves to prolonged vegetation. On the other hand, the return of the islands, while not guaranteeing an influx of money and technology, will deepen the split of Russian society between "patriots" and those who "sell Russia out," and encourage Germany, China and Finland to resume their territorial claims on Russia.

Complications in our relationships with the southern neighbours – Turks, Iranians and Afghans – should not be ruled out either. They intend to agitate the Moslem nations of the former Union with the Koran and the ideas of pan-Islamism, which will compel the Slavs to react and to take countermeasures. Korea may have all sorts of surprises up its sleeve for us. If the North Korean regime collapses and South Korea moves in, a major conflict may break out in that region, with the USA, Japan and China involved. The CIS or Russia will hardly manage to sit it out.

Our policy towards the Third World is to be revised. The relations with India are already on the wane. In the whirlpool of events, the legal successors to the USSR

Drawing by Dmitry Moskvin

have somehow forgotten about the tested friend of the Soviet Union. This hurts the Indians' feelings. Besides, they are upset about the fact that the main stronghold of socialism and anti-imperialism has crumbled all of a sudden, depriving India of the foundation which its foreign policy has rested upon, and leaving it single-handed vis-à-vis its former opponents – Pakistan, China, the USA. The CIS will not quarrel with India, of course. There are no clashes of interests as ever, but the two will hardly be on intimate terms with one another again, either.

In the Middle East, too, Moscow will lose much of its former appeal, although the Arabs will still depend on it in their eternal conflict with Israel. The CIS will play the role of an unbiassed broker, but in the minds of the Commonwealth leaders the Mid-Eastern problems will take a back seat to the domestic ones. Southeast Asia will start falling out of the habit of taking the Soviet factor into account. The ASEAN will forget all about the blood-curdling "Soviet threat," and Indochina – about the once generous Big Brother. Black Africa and Latin America will disappear behind the horizon of the CIS's foreign policy.

Russia will revive

The above seems to suggest the conclusion that the great power has passed away. The long-distance race is over, the long-distance runner has laid himself out, fallen down, and is breathing his last breath.

It would be a mistake, though, to dismiss Great Russia as good as dead.

Russia remains. Its population is over 150 million, and its people are educated, hard-working and capable of great endurance. They are still in control of enormous expanses of land abounding in natural resources. They possess an enormous, even though antediluvial, economic infrastructure. Finally, this people has one of the world's largest and strongest armies. The genes of the Russians and of the Russian state bear the memory of past greatness and of the ways of attaining it. Hundreds of nations living at the junction of Europe and Asia retain the need for restoring peace and stability there. Under the banner of the CIS or whatever, the parent state, a thousand years old, will transcend from clashes and wrangles with its neighbours to bringing them together under its wing again. And they will seek Russia's patronage – otherwise they will never succeed in stopping interminable bloodshed and destruction (the situation in the Transcaucasus is a case in point). A renovated Eurasian power will join the world community, but preserve its unique features which distinguish it from Western democracies. It stands out for its enormous size, ethnic diversity and highly distinctive traditions.

An attempt to ignore this distinctiveness will bring a disaster comparable to what happened after 1917, when Russia withdrew from world civilization to a realm of bloody dreams and illusions. Today, there is the opposite trend back to the roots of Russian civilization. This involves a different danger. A too vigorous "plucking" of the weakened empire by the former "junior partners" or by the overconfident neighbours (Japan, Germany) may cause an unprecedented flare-up of Russian nationalism. Such a flare-up is all the more likely in a situation where the country is in a state of economic chaos, universal despair and bitterness, with the idea of "proletarian internationalism" discredited.

Old clients are not served

Moscow has a convenient chance to revise its policy vis-á-vis Kim Il Sung and North Korea

The preparedness to sign a joint document with South Korea declaring the whole peninsula a nuclear-free zone and the transfer of command over the Korean People's Army to his son, signal that Kim Il Sung, 79, is busy getting his heir apparent ready for the throne.

The Great Leader has long since offered reasons to justify the necessity and expedience of his son's taking over as leader of North Korea. An experienced politician, Kim Il Sung understands that the change of socialist kings may not be very smooth and is in a hurry to crown the heir.

The unexpected preparedness to make a deal with the archenemy, South Korea, and to assure the world community that Pyongyang is not making its own nuclear bomb does not at all suggest any changes in the policies of Kim Il Sung. The only purpose of his manoeuvring is to provide a favourable international climate for his son and successor, Kim Jong Il. The father wants international recognition for his son, but the latter has a notorious reputation. He is known to be the head of the North Korean secret service noted for its cruelty, and the mastermind of two large-scale terrorist attacks: an attempt to eliminate the South Korean government, which left 17 people dead, and the blowing up of a South Korean jet, when 115 died. Pyongyang's nuclear project has not met with understanding and support even in Beijing, where Kim Il Sung has recently made a secret visit. The North Korean leader seems to have abandoned even his nucler dreams for the sake of his son.

China is the only country which Kim Il Sung still visits. His son, 49, is known for his love for Japanese-made consumer electronics, fashion clothes and sweet life, dreams of travelling places and seeing the world. North Korea has been admitted to the United Nations and this opens a theoretical opportunity for Kim Il Sung to travel to New York. However, the Korean ruling family are not in the habit of leaving the capital for too long, fearing a coup. The pictures showing Kim Il Sung and his son surrounded by enthusiastic crowds have nothing to do with reality. The father is never seen together with the son, so that possible plotters could not eliminate them together in one attack. In April 1987, when I attended the three-day celebrations in Pyongyang devoted to the anniversary of the Great Leader, I searched for the figure of the son side by side with the father, but in vain. I thought that North Korea's only fat men avoid being seen together not to irritate the half-starved population, but I was wrong. Marshal Kim Il Sung whose only victories were those over his political opponents was concerned only about his own security. While the father received congratulations, the son was busy providing security.

Kim Il Sung: in a hurry to bring his son to power

Kim Jong Il: a weak shadow of his father, he will not last long as North Korean leader

Frankly speaking, I have a problem visualizing President Yeltsin's letter of congratulations addressed to the Beloved Administrator of the Korean People, Kim Jong Il.

The Soviet Union had an alliance treaty with North Korea. The Russian Federation should get rid of this legacy. New Russia cannot afford having allied relations with the dictatorial regime of North Korea, even if such relations are only on paper.

First of all, it is necessary to publish a White Book on the history of Moscow-Pyongyang relations. The people of Russia will find it interesting to know how much this country has spent on the Far Eastern client. It is necessary to halt the exports of combat hardware, spare parts and equipment, including dual-purpose equipment, to North Korea.

Some Russian newspapers have reported that the North Korean security services are actively operating in this country harassing Koreans who work here. Isn't it time the Russian leadership ordered that all operations of foreign secret services be stopped in Russia?

Last year, Alexander Kapto, former head of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, was appointed Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang. With his views, Alexander Kapto would have been more suitable as the North Korean ambassador in Moscow, not new Russia's representative in North Korea. Before they appointed a new ambassador, the parliamentary foreign affairs committee and the humanitarian problems department of the Russian Foreign Ministry should have openly condemned the repressive regime of North Korea.

One can object that there is no use bringing moral considerations into politics and that the interests of the state are above all... However, these are purely pragmatic reasons why this country should revise its attitude to North Korea.

Kim Jong Il will not last long after Kim Il Sung goes. The examples of China and Albania, where heirs of Mao and Enver Hoxha lost power soon after they got it, are readily available to support this opinion.

The cruel and cunning Kim Il Sung has become a veteran leader because he had survived a bloody war with political opponents. As for Kim Jong Il, his way to the top was paved with roses and he is nothing but a spoilt child of his father's.

The top leaders in Pyongyang who are forced to obey Kim Il Sung fearing repressions, want to get rid of the fear and do not need a new tyrant. They have also had to learn to survive, and they are much more experienced than Kim Jong Il.

It is easy to predict what will happen after the ouster of Kim Jong Il. For the sake of stability, his successors will have to start liberalization and reforms. German experience suggests that unification will become inevitable in this case.

The new country which will emerge on the borders of Russia will be ruled by politicians from Seoul, not Pyongyang. East German experience shows that North Koreans will be reluctant to forget that it was Moscow that brought Kim Il Sung to power in 1945 and later helped him create a concentration camp as large as the country. There is no reason why Russia should increase its debt to the Korean people.

Leonid Mlechin

"My home is where there is freedom"
says Prof. Jiri Valenta

Dr. Jiri Valenta is director of the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies and a professor of political sciences at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami. He left Czecho-Slovakia in September, 1968 at the age of 24, when he only began his scientific career. Today Prof. Valenta is considered a great authority in problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In May 1991 he returned to Prague with the aim of organizing the work of the institute of international relations at the foreign ministry of the republic.

Recently Prof. **JIRI VALENTA** visited Moscow, where he was interviewed by a *New Times* reporter.

Q. You have devoted almost 25 years to the study of events connected with the "Prague spring" of 1968. It is an extremely broad theme, of course. Therefore, if you do not mind, let's take one aspect only. What influence did those events exert on subsequent developments in Czecho-Slovakia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in general?

A. The "Prague spring" of 1968 was the time of beautiful hopes not only for Czechs and Slovaks but, possibly – though not fully realized then – hopes for the peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries of the former socialist bloc. The suppression of the "spring" dealt a severe blow to the peoples of Czecho-Slovakia, the positions of socialism and communism, the democratic forces in the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty states, and the advocates of reforms. The Czechs and Slovaks, traditionally friendly to the Soviet Union, saw in it an enemy, and the feeling of friendship gave way to hatred. The USSR suffered most because it missed the chance to use the experience of the Czecho-Slovak transition to "socialism with a human face" and to move toward a more democratic system capable of developing into genuine democracy.

If your leaders used this experience instead of suppressing it your current perestroika-revolution would be more gradual and would not lead to the breakup of the state, to its subsequent transformations and to the impoverishment of the population. The anti-communist and anti-Soviet sentiments would not be so strong in Czecho-Slovakia either.

Q. Are they strong today too?

A. Yes, they are strong even today, though anti-Sovietism has slackened in connection with developments in the Soviet Union. Even opponents understand that the changes in Czecho-Slovakia, in all countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe became possible only thanks to the stand taken by the Soviet leadership. It seems Mikhail Gorbachev realized long before 1989 that democratization and the disintegration of the old system in these countries would proceed very quickly and that the last chance of a peaceful renewal of socialism was missed in 1968.

In no other socialist country did the leadership understand that, and therefore they missed the train of history. The East European Communists kept their countries from democracy till the last moment. As a result, the idea of socialism died in the minds of their compatriots. The future of the new left parties founded on the ruins of the former ruling parties will most likely be linked with the common way of European social democracy. As for the similarity and distinctions in the processes now under way in the former USSR and the Eastern Europe, Czecho-Slovakia in particular, there is no antagonism here in my opinion. Vaclav Havel has simply managed to bring Gorbachev's democratic reforms to their logical completion. The new phase of democratization in the East European countries is characterized by the development of pluralism of the forces involved in it. One of the directions development is taking is the formation of broad political and public coalitions. As people assimilate the changes they begin to understand that each new social force or tendency is as legal as the authority of individuals in the government or in leading organizations. This process is taking place in Czecho-Slovakia and, as far as I understand, in Russia and other states of the former Union.

"Vaclav Havel has brought Gorbachev's democratic reforms to their logical end..."

TASS photo

Q. You said that the idea of socialism was crushed by tanks in 1968. For how long? For ever? Don't you think it will revive at some new stage of the development of civilization?

A. In any case, it will be a very long process. True, it should be said that the idea of

social justice, if not socialism, has always been strong in Czecho-Slovakia. It was also strong in the Soviet Union, though, as it is already clear to many people, it was most often understood wrongly.

Q. In what way?

A. The idea of social justice was understood as general equalization in the social, national and economic fields. However, profound contradictions grew behind this façade, which was artificial to a large extent. When the façade crashed down acute problems were brought into the open. They led to a deep and widespread crisis in the former Union.

Q. There are splendid words in the Czecho-Slovak National Anthem: "Where is my home?" Speaking of what was left of the Soviet Union, I cannot say today where my home is. This question is now asked by many of the tens of millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians, all who lived outside their ethnic territories when the Union broke up. You have the experience of a man who emigrated and returned from emigration. How will you answer the question: "Where is my home?"

A. I lived in the United States half of my life because I did not want to return to occupied Czecho-Slovakia. Today I have returned to my homeland to help it, though I am an American citizen. The best answer to the question, where is my home, will possibly sound in this way: my home is where there is freedom. Where man feels free. He cannot feel at home under the regimes of Qaddafi, Castro and Hussein.

I cannot feel free in a totalitarian or authoritarian state. It is not important for me whether I can have good breakfast in the morning. I want to have the possibility to read a free newspaper in the morning. This is why I left Czecho-Slovakia in 1968.

I think it is also important for you. If Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other republics become democratic it will not be so important where man lives. It is important how he lives, what rights he enjoys, and to what extent he is free. An individual will be two or three times richer if he can understand, accept and absorb two or three cultures. In general, we must be citizens of the world, and not only of the country of our birth.

Q. Today it is also a problem for Czechs and Slovaks.

A. I am extremely concerned over their ethnic and national disputes. I understand Czechs and Slovaks, just as I understand Russians, Ukrainians and all others. But, I think, such disputes belong to the 19th, not the 20th century. The future belongs to integration, not disunity. The terrible example of Yugoslavia must become instructive.

That is why in Czecho-Slovakia, too, national disputes must be kept at a civilized parliamentary level, however difficult it may be.

Q. As I understand, President Vaclav Havel is doing a great deal in this respect. Don't you think, nevertheless, that he may go down in history as a tragic figure? As a follower of the cause and ideas of Masaryk, the founder of the democratic Czecho-Slovak state, Vaclav Havel has to defend today both national unity and democratic standards...

A. I think Vaclav Havel is both a happy and tragic figure. He is a surprisingly honest and pure man, much more morally pure in his deeds and thoughts than many present Czecho-Slovak politicians. Sometimes it even seems to me that power is rather alien to him and that he would gladly return to his position of a playwright. He is an intellectual, a man of ideas.

Agreeing to become president, he thought not about himself but about his country and his people, though he must have been satisfied with the fact that the system against which he courageously fought for 20 years had finally collapsed. Vaclav Havel is certainly deeply grieved by the tendencies of both primitive nationalism and anti-democratism which he faces in the parliament and in daily life. This is tragic for him. On the other hand, without him it would perhaps be very difficult and even impossible to unite all Czechs and Slovaks in their desire for democratic aims. No other politician could become such a common banner. Of course, today Havel experiences terrible pressure from various forces. I think in 1989 he made a mistake by not inviting to the government many of the prominent figures of 1968, subsequently expelled from the Communist Party and ousted from politics. He could have found a common language with them.

Q. The situation of Havel reminds me in some respect of the situation of Gorbachev. The politician who initiated *perestroika* in the USSR has become a kind of grave-digger for the Soviet Union, though against his will.

A. It is a tragic fate, indeed. I think Gorbachev deserves a better fate, especially for what he did in 1987 and 1988 – Afghanistan, *modus vivendi* with America, and *glasnost*. But, on the other hand, he did not go further than his outlook as a reform-minded party leader allowed him. Dubcek and Yeltsin were prepared to go and did go further. However, before that they were subjected to humiliation and experienced the failure of the former notions of comradeship, the party, the state and justice. Humiliation makes one think, revise and reappraise political and moral values, standards and concepts. I think that in the course of such a revision and reappraisal of the path traversed by them Dubcek and Yeltsin, former partocrats, became democrats. Gorbachev never experienced humiliation till August 1991. He was intent on reforming and did reform the system to a considerable extent, and for this he deserves profound gratitude. However, for too long he did not dare go beyond the limits of the system, and it was late when he tried to do that.

Nevertheless, I and others must feel obliged to him for what he has done for the USSR, Eastern Europe and the whole world.

Q. Let's return to relations between our countries or, more exactly, between Czecho-Slovakia and Russia. How do you see them in 1992?

A. I think, and it is already evident today, that our economic relations will be based on bilateral treaties at government level and between enterprises and firms. Since the two countries do not have enough hard currency, emphasis will be laid on clearing and barter. Also possible is broader cooperation, with the participation of the United States and other industrial countries capable of guaranteeing Czech investments in the Russian economy, and vice versa. In my opinion, the most attractive is the Finnish model of bilateral relations, not only in trade but also in politics.

I think we shall be able to create something of the kind, because the new team of politicians under Russian President Yeltsin is more sensitive to the subtleties of domestic and foreign policy than all the preceding Kremlin hierarchs taken together.

I would like to use this occasion to thank Russia and the former Soviet Union for their support of the Czecho-Slovak democratic forces. There have been complications in our relations, but there are also unfading values. In this connection I would like to ask all prominent figures of present-day Russia, first of all Boris Yeltsin, to help find the documents relating to the invasion of Czecho-Slovakia. These documents are kept in the archives of the former central committee of the Communist Party, the KGB and the defence ministry. In view of the election campaign in Czecho-Slovakia, when the public keenly reacts to any extraordinary events, the transfer of these documents would further improve the image of Russia in our country.

Interviewer
Alexander Didusenko

The forgotten drum

Irina Mlechina

The Little Red Riding Hood, the die-hards, the working-class morality in Germany and convergence – which is going on, after all

Some twenty years ago I collected amusing newspaper headlines for a hobby. Most of them were variations on the same theme, our international news commentators' favourite at that time: "The Neo-Nazis Beating the Drum," "A Witches' Sabbath of Brownshirt Survivors," "Neo-Fascists Raising their Heads," "The Die-Hard Have-Beens Hankering after Revenge," "Noxious Seeds Fall on Fertile Soil," and so on, and so forth. It is worth noting, for fairness' sake, that West German society was also much concerned about the suddenly imminent threat of neo-Nazism, and the concern was shared by serious – or, to use a term current at Moscow University's Faculty of Journalism, "quality" – German press which carried articles entitled, for instance, "The Thadden March on Bonn" (Adolf von Thadden, the then leader of the neo-Nazi party, scrambled for a Bundestag seat).

Stürmer in Moscow

I remember the feeling I had then that the theme was totally unrelated to our life, had nothing to do with it. Those were "their" morals, the die-hard have-beens were beating their drum in some distant world beyond my reach, thousands of light years away historically and geographically. Thanks to a strong cast-iron curtain our two countries could not become communicating vessels like the other countries were in the rest of the world, and our ideologically sterile, decontaminated social organism was immune to the horrible bacilli swarming "out there." Therefore the theme was as exotic as elephant hunting in Africa. Although the outbreak of neo-Nazi feelings in the FRG at the turn of the seventies did worry that country's democratic public, our own journalists commented upon it with cynical detachment, even if in the form of angry denunciation. The more urgent the calls "to prevent a repeat of the past" were, the less the writers (and probably their readers) believed in the reality of that threat.

Could anyone imagine then that their past would ever become our present? That we shall hear, at home, frankly fascist calls, much more flagrantly so, in fact, than those made by the not-quite-unruly-yet West German neo-Nazis of those years? Could even a morbid imagination dream up the nightmare of our house walls being pasted over with leaflets, and our newsstalls offering booklets which Julius Streicher, a war criminal and one of the Third Reich's most rabid anti-Semites, hanged in Nuremberg, would have happily featured in his *Stürmer?* Did it seem likely then that some of the papers, officially registered in the Russian Federation, would regularly carry articles which might have come straight from the notorious *Völkischer Beobachter,* a mouthpiece of the German National Socialist Workers' Party? That certain public speakers would openly call the citizens of Russia for what the Führer had called upon the Germans to do in the early thirties, and echo his ravings in the early nineties?

It looks as if von Thadden's neo-Nazis (who, incidentally, took offence at being referred to as such) were much more restrained and moderate for all the shock they gave the law-abiding citizens of the FRG. There is no denying that they detested Turks and other foreign workers who had flooded West Germany, that they demanded "cleanliness and order," did not like the Americans, and protested against the "sway of democrats"; nevertheless, they were cautious not to provoke accusations of following Nazi slogans and vigorously denied – in words, anyway – their connection with Nazism and Nazi ideology.

A beer dinner

In 1967, during my first visit to the FRG, I found myself in a small group of journalists who attended a neo-Nazi rally. Not that the rally was the greatest attraction in the country which made a staggering impression on me (I had never been to the West before). I just needed material for a story, and a "neo-Nazi rally" looked like a surefire theme; besides that, I was curious, I admit. Following brief but tense negotiations, the organizers let us into the restaurant where the rally was in progress. I saw civilized-looking elderly gentlemen of soldierly



Germany. A winter fairy tale: the German lesson in

bearing; some wore dark glasses which gave them the mysterious and sinister look of Totenkopf SS-men; some of them had actually served in the SS troops, I was told. There were almost no younger people among them. Over their inevitable beers (which reminded me of what I had read about the "beer putsch" and, in general, the spirit of German pubs where Hitler's Nazism had ripened) the elderly speakers took turns calling for the same "cleanliness and order," demanded the expulsion of the presumptuous foreigners who were after taking over power, exploiting the German people and imposing alien values on them. Their arguments were familiar to me: Germany was for the Germans, we must put an end to national humiliation, to the plunder of our land, out with the Turks and other interlopers. Now, thanks to *glasnost* and freedom of assembly, Soviet citizens can easily superimpose those speeches upon the programme statements made by the leaders of the Pamyat and suchlike organizations; all they have to do to make the coincidence complete is replace the realities of the past by those of the present day, and the word "German" by the word "Russian." "Stop cheating the Russian (instead of the German) people. Such is the truth about (Jewish dominance, the world capitalist conspiracy)."

The German neo-Nazis of the sixties and the seventies were no harmless creatures, of course. It was obvious, however, that they had not the slightest chance in the FRG, that the democratic system which had taken shape over the postwar years was sufficiently strong and stable, that the process of overcoming the inheritance of the past was deep-going enough (with all its flaws, tirelessly exposed by the leading West German writers and political journalists) for all these elderly gentlemen with soldierly bearing, making their revanchist and neo-Nazi speeches in tidy pubs, to remain an exotic minority of no serious danger.

A runaway suitcase

Over the quarter of a century since that first trip, which amounted to the discovery of an entirely different world, I have repeatedly succeeded in re-visiting the FRG (succeed is the word we Soviet citizens use in such cases). And although each time, after a few years' interval, the first sight of the street crowds, streets, squares and houses was as dazzling as ever, I sensed a gradual and barely perceptible emergence of similarities between the two countries: convergence, a mere mention of which used to set our ideologists' teeth on edge, did take place ("the process was under way"). While coming under strong Western influence, the East, in its turn, had a certain influence on the West. Following the student unrest of the late sixties, Western morals and manners had deteriorated somewhat. There were less well-mannered people and more ill-mannered ones. The "jeans revolution" had made Western street crowds much like ours, outwardly, although their jeans were better-quality, of course. I found West Germans slightly less polite and obliging than I had remembered them; sometimes a department store salesgirl was shockingly like her Soviet counterpart, or a cabman was occasionally as unfriendly as his Moscow opposite numbers used to be when we still had cabs in Moscow.

While on my recent visit to Germany last December I felt almost at home in the Hamburg Airport upon arriving there from Munich by air and discovering the loss of my suitcase. The conveyer belt safely delivered my travelling bag, but my suitcase was nowhere in sight. The solitary airport attendant I found in the baggage retrieval room referred me, with a well-familiar indifference, to the Lufthansa bureau where the loss was registered, a loss certificate issued, and an immediate delivery of the suitcase to my hotel promised. It arrived neither by night nor in the following morning. My German hosts' endless calls to the airport drew a slightly vexed reaction from the Lufthansa people, which was reminiscent of the kind of service we get at home. When the suitcase, which had for some reason set out on a German tour of its own, finally got to the Hamburg Airport, I began to have my doubts about the reality of convergence. Judging by the circuitous route my suitcase had taken, convergence was, indeed, under way; but judging by the fact that the retrieval of the runaway suitcase took less than 24 hours, it was not.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall accelerated the two-way flow of people and ideas tremendously. Ex-Soviet citizens, whose origin is betrayed by their gloomy facial expression, are roaming the streets of Munich and Frankfurt. One feels surprised to hear Russian spoken there, but not so surprised to know that those people's problems — accommodation, jobs, money — were much like those they've had at home except that in Germany they did not have to queue for food and other necessities of life. Germany remains a land of abundance, and there is definitely no sign of convergence in the sphere of supply and demand.

A punch breaks down

In contrast to the dreary and hopeless emptiness of Moscow stores, the fabulous material wealth of the West does not merely overwhelm a Soviet visitor, it causes a shock, a sense of unreality, although what can be more real than heaps of multi-coloured fruit on outdoor counters under dazzling garlands of Christmas lamps, and miles upon miles of shop windows displaying pink hams, an incredible variety of cheeses, cakes, fanciful New Year sweets, gifts, adornments, souvenirs...

The charming young women who accompanied me on my labyrinthine Christmas shopping — or rather window shopping — tours looked incredulous as I

tolerance

described Moscow's desolate shopping scene to them. By a great stretch of imagination they could picture a situation where one hundred and fifty or, at the very least, a hundred varieties of cheese were available instead of the normal 200. They admitted that, theoretically, of course, the choice of liver sausage could be reduced from 25 kinds to just ten or even five (oh, no!). But they just could not see, in their mind's eye, the bare shelves of what used to be Moscow supermarkets, or endless lines of people queueing up for hours to buy food which goes under the simple and short name of "sausage." I must confess that I even felt condescendingly sorry for those women – they did not know what a unique historical experience they were missing.

I had had the same feeling of condescension some time in the seventies when I stood at the Cologne railway station in a line of three. The line kept moving steadily until an incredible thing happened: the ticket clerk mumbled something with an apologetic smile and closed his window. "So ist die Arbeitsmoral in Deutschland geworden!" ("Such is work morality in Germany today!), an elderly lady in furs who stood in front of me exclaimed angrily. Having shared her righteous indignation, I inquired what had happened. It turned out that the ticket clerk's punch had broken down and had to be fixed right away. The entire hold-up lasted for about thirty seconds or so. The dramatic decline in work morality in Germany shocked me, a citizen of the country where work morality was, naturally, above reproach because work was a matter of honour, courage and something else, I forget which.

This time I had the impression that my German hosts somehow associated the problem of work morality in the former Soviet Union with the present level of our economy. In any case, having readily answered all my questions about the state of German spirit, culture and literature, they proceeded, there and then, asking me what my country's problems were.

I was eager to find out what the residents of those wealthy, prosperous cities thought about the outlook for our country's future, and whether they saw any connection between the situation in the former USSR and last autumn's developments in Germany when groups of frienzied youths began to attack foreign workers – Vietnamese, Africans, Gypsies, Romanians and our own ex-compatriots – chiefly in the "new districts," i.e., in the former GDR. As I heard out the answers to my questions, I recalled the "drum beating neo-brownshirts" of twenty years ago. At that time, Turks were the objects of hatred. Now citizens from many less fortunate parts of the world, the former Soviet Union included, have been added to them.

As I strolled allong beautifully decorated pre-Christmas streets with their scrubbed pavements, amidst roses blooming in mid-December, in a seemingly carefree crowd, I just could not imagine gangs of shrieking, stone-throwing and stick-brandishing youths storming the wretched refugees hostel. A charming puppet show was in progress in the shop windows of the Hertie department store stretching for about a mile in downtown Munich: suspended on invisible strings and controlled by an invisible electronic puppeteer, marionettes acted out scenes from famous fairy tales. The Little Red Riding Hood, the Show Queen, the Hänsel and Gretel... Children and adults alike pressed their noses to the window panes and argued heatedly over which fairy tale this or that character came from. That was touching and human, life in that country looked peaceful and cosy; it was hard to believe that conflicts and cruelty existed there, too, and that some people wanted to drive others out.

Although somewhat shaken by the reunification process, German society is still capable of emerging socially, politically and psychologically intact form rather trying situations. The ethical norms and values which have taken shape over the postwar decades are durable enough. Among those basic values I should single out tolerance for different opinions, for unusual appearance, unorthodox behaviour, in fact, for everything except what grossly violates the laws of the human community and what has been rejected as the inheritance of the disgraceful past. Tolerance has its limits, it includes intolerance of intolerance; after all, fascism means above all a militant rejection of all that is alien.

Soviet "blacks"

Although they did occur in the FRG before, outbreaks of nationalism and hostility towards "interlopers" now originate in the East, in the "new districts," where the false and ostentatious morality of the "brotherhood of socialist nations" was inculcated in people for years and decades. The GDR hypocritically put all the blame for the past on the "other," "imperialist" German state, and mechanically hammered into its citizens' heads a set of anti-fascit ideologems; as it always happens in case of forced feeding, however, this ideological food was not assimilated and was rejected, although outwardly everything was just fine. As a result, it turned out that a certain proportion of the East German youth was more responsive to nationalistic ideas than their Western coevals: such is the price of lies and cynicism elevated to the rank of state policy.

At the end of the seventies, a young Soviet embassy driver took me to the Cologne Airport; he had arrived in the FRG only a short while before, and was not quite at home on the Autobahn. Nevertheless, he knew all about local customs and morals. I wondered outloud why the roads and streets were deserted – it was Sunday morning – and the young man explained: "You see, the Germans go out of town for weekends. It is only the Turks and suchlike Gastarbeiters who hang around here on days off." I always recall that young driver when I hear, while standing in Moscow food lines, talk about "those blacks" buying up everything (I thought at first the "blacks" meant Negroes, but learned later that the term applied to Caucasians); or about Jews who "hold all the key government posts" and "pull all the strings." In the FRG, on the other hand, no self-respecting person ever speaks sligtingly of foreign workers, immigrants and refugees – making disparaging remarks about them is regarded as bad taste and it would never occur to a truly civilized person to do so. Upon hearing the word "Jew" no one there will grin and start telling dirty jokes. I remember the phrase by an old German acquaintance of mine: "Hitler has broken us out of the habit to calculate the percentage of alien blood in one another."

The sense of guilt and personal responsibility for Nazi atrocities has determined that country's spiritual atmosphere and the special intonation of postwar West German literature. Overcoming the past has become the core of public discussions. No matter how superficial and at times inadequate this process may be, it has not ceased to this day, making its imprint on the discussion of any pressing social problem..

Over the past few months, the Stasi, the GDR's security service, has been perhaps the biggest talking point in Germany. Its archives are gradually disclosing facts and circumstances that set the "old regions" of Germany all agog. Some of the citizens once believed to be of impeccable reputation turn out to have been the Stasi's informers even high-ranking staff agents.

Even in this campaign of unmasking, however, which cannot but inflame the passions, the spirit of civilized restraint predominates. The situation is being analyzed jointly. Tolerance, fostered over the postwar decades, shows here, just as it does in the discussion on the rise of nationalism and xenophobia. Lessons in German, which are so useful to take now, have turned out to be lessons in tolerance above all. ■

If Dodo allows...

Of Nigeria's seven heads of government three were killed and another three removed from power. General Ibrahim Babangida, the present head of the administration in Lagos, hopes to retire on a pension with honours

I was invited to a meeting with the chief of the Yoruba tribe in Abeokuta. We travelled 100 km on the road from Lagos and did not see landscape gladdening the eye – only factory and administrative buildings and power transmission lines. Europeans gave this coast of West Africa a sinister name – the White Man's Grave. In the past heat, malaria and other tropical diseases claimed the lives of many white merchants, soldiers and officials, all those who, as Rudyard Kipling wrote, bore "the white man's burden" among sullen tribes, half-devils and half-children. It is a paradox: we whites wonder at the colour of skin of Africans while they wonder at our reddened, sunburned skin, sharp, bird-like noses, and thin lips. The Yoruba call whites oy ibo – people who lost the colour of their skin, sun-burned in the wind. However, for all people, black or white, the evil spirit Dodo reigns here. According to popular belief, it dwells in brushwood or in lakes.

Abeokuta lies among granite hills. Cacao-trees stretch in endless lines from the road. The life of of peasants from the ancient Yoruba tribe, engaged in farming for centuries, depends on the yield of cocoa beans and the fluctuation of prices for them.

Small shops at every step offer a wide choice of goods and services. It is not Paris, of course, but signs attract the eye: "London tailor. European fashions, African prices." Or take another sign: "Shoemaker of King Solomon. Day and night service, but not on credit."

Local residents take pride in the Olumo rock on the eastern outskirts of the city. It represents two oval-shaped boulders placed one on top of the other. It was near the rock that I met with A.O.Shoetan, head (oba) of the Yoruba tribe.

Racing with the tribal chief

Shoetan is 61 years old. He has two wives and many children. The oba is one of the 14 advisers of the big oba from the Ogun state. Shoetan, who looks young for his age, wore a dazzlingly white silk agbada – a national attire resembling a loose overall. On his neck were massive and heavy coral laces. He has a sleek dark skin, regarded by Africans as a sign of health and viability. The oba certainly has higher education received in London, of course. "In our country you will not find an oba without higher education," Shoetan told me proudly. The tribal chief is a diploma'd engineer. He does not loaf, although he could. From morning till night the chief rides on a car to settle the affairs of his firm City Engineering in which he is chairman of the board and director. There are no privileges for his children. One of them, David, is an employee in the federal ministry of information, though he has the honourable title of the chief's son. The oba is busy the whole day: in the day-time he fixes the affairs of his own firm and in the evenings he settles civil disputes of every kind or takes part in the meetings of the consultative council under the chief oba of the Ogun state.

Shoetan, who leads a sound way of life, offered me to race with him in climbing on the spiral staircase to the top of the Olumo rock. To my shame, I must admit that the oba outstripped me in this race, though he is 20 years older than I am. Having recovered my breath, I asked the tribal chief whether the political passions running high down there, in the valley, threaten the traditional institutions of power.

"No, Nigeria differs from French-speaking countries where the colonialists have done away with chiefs and set up damned prefectures. The oba institution will never be abolished in our country. Before adopting any decision relating to the Ogun state the Lagos authorities come here to take counsel with us, and it's up to us whether to approve their decision or not," he replied.

"How to become a chief?"

Shoetan smiled benevolently:

"First of all, you must be a citizen of Nigeria. There are two ways of gaining this honourable title. One is by right of succession. For instance, my elder son will become an oba in this way. Another way is to do services to the Yoruba tribe."

"The second way is more complex and seems unrealizable," I said.

"You don't say. We have just bestowed the title of chief on Mrs Dabul:"

"A sensation?"

"No, Mrs Dabul comes



Nigeria's coat of arms and its President Ibrahim Babangida

The women-guardians of the eternal flame on the Olumo mount

from our city, from the Yoruba tribe. She went to study in Lagos and there, thanks to her talent and diligence, she headed the Dabul Travel Agency. As you have probably guessed, she sends tourists to Abeokuta. That's the whole deal. The city has improved its financial affairs. She has grown rich. The traders and employers are pleased. In short, Madam Dabul has stirred our ant-hill. Isn't she a chief?"

I did not argue with the respected oba. Chiefs are always right.

Nigerian "Maradona"

Nevertheless, the life of over 100 million Nigerians (a fifth of the population of Africa) depends not on the mythic protector of the Yoruba tribe Olumo and not on the favours of the tribal chief, with all my respect for him, but on the decisions made in Lagos.

Ibrahim Babangida, called Nigerian "Maradona" for his adroitness and extraordinary moves, seized power from the military regime of Gen. Buhari in 1985. But after two years of totalitarian rule he declared a programme for the army's withdrawal from the political scene. Last August Babangida celebrated his 50th birthday. His career is linked with the army. He graduated from a military college in Nigeria and continued studies in Great Britain, India and the United States. Babangida carries great weight in international affairs. Last year he was elected chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

After he came to power Babangida took drastic measures to stabilize the economic situation in the country. A programme of restructuring the economy was adopted in 1986. It was drawn up by Western economists and then approved by the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank agreed to finance the programme. Western bankers knew where to invest money. Nigeria holds ninth place in oil reserves and fifth place in gas reserves. In short, Babangida followed the way which has already led many Third World nations to success.

At the same time, the general suspended vast and unprofitable projects, the so-called "white elephants." Among them is the iron and steel works in Ajaokuta, under construction with Soviet assistance, the works described in the Soviet press as "the steel heart of Nigerian industry." The government slashed funds for the ambitious project of building a new capital in Abuja.

Having stabilized the economy and given enterprising people a lucky chance to grow rich and having laid the foundation of society – the middle class, Ibrahim Babangida set about implementing his programme of democratization.

Parties and elections

First of all, the activity of parties and public organizations has been allowed and a new Constitution, faithfully copied from the American, has been framed. A Constitutional Assembly has been convened for the transition period. The inveterate politicians have been categorically forbidden to "play politics." The organizations advocating the ideas of "scientific communism" have also been prohibited from engaging in their activity.

Within a short time 13 political parties were formed in the country. Having read their election manifestos, Babangida concluded that none of them deserved recognition. According to him, "only the highest moral standards can satisfy the Nigerians." That is why he dispersed the "immoral politicians" in October of 1989 and gave orders for the formation of two non-tribal parties and the elaboration of party programmes that would contribute to the "unity and welfare" of Nigeria.

Two parties emerged in the political scene. According to Babangida's plan, one of them is "slightly left of the centre" and the other "slightly right of the centre." The parties are financed only by the state. They are not allowed to accept donations from local citizens or foreigners. In keeping with the rules of the game dictated by the general, local government elections were held in December of 1990, and a year later elections were held in the states of Nigeria. By October 1, 1992, after the presidential election, power is to be completely transferred from the military to a civilian president, a representative of one of the two parties.

The Social Democratic Party, "slightly left of the centre," is headed by Baba Kingibe, a former diplomat. The party, whose flag shows a pranced white horse on the green cloth, has advanced the slogan of "five freedoms" – from diseases, poverty, ignorance, exploitation and oppression.

The National Republican Convention, "slightly right of the centre," is headed by Tom Omoghegbe Ikimi, a former architect and now an employer and millionaire. The white-cloth flag of the party has an eagle depicted on it. The NRC has advanced the following slogans: free and fair enterprise, food and water for everyone, as well as work, free education and medical care.

Both parties promise a paradise on earth within exactly 900 days. They constantly quarrel with each other and hurl insults at each other. The members of the NRC are labelled by Social Democrats as vultures, while the former refer to the latter as "draught animals." Quarrels sometimes end in fighting with the fists and a threatening confrontation. However, blood has not yet been shed. The military are on the alert.

If I were a Nigerian I simply would not

know for whom to vote. Incidentally, Nigerians themselves do not know, either. During the last elections not more than 40 percent of the voters went to the polls.

One should see how elections are held in Nigeria. Voters gather behind the portraits of "their" candidates, forming lines of different sizes. This is done so because half the population of Nigeria are illiterates. Elections last from noon to six o'clock in the afternoon. Men and officers also vote. But they should be dressed in civilian clothes. A day before the poll shops, banks and restaurants are closed. It is impossible to buy alcoholic drinks miles away. The voters are not allowed to have injury-inflicting items on them. Between the two lines stand policemen armed with clubs.



A.O.Shoetan, the chief of the Yoruba tribe

Will "papa" Babangida resign? It is quite possible that he will be "asked" to remain in power. Nigerians fear that if the military go, the country will plunge into the chaos of civil war and no one will be able to guarantee the territorial integrity of the state and the continuation of economic reforms. Here is the opinion of a top official in Abuja who did not identify himself: "Whatever happens I do not think civilians will be able to hold out for more than a year before the army led by Babangida interferes again."

Who knows, maybe the general tries on a civilian suit in the evenings.

Christians and Moslems

"Nigeria is a dirty, heartless, noisy, boastful, dishonest and vulgar land. In short, it is one of the most unpleasant places in the world." These words were said by Chinua Achebe, a prominent Nigerian writer. I can imagine what row would have been made by our "patriots" had any of the Russian writers dared simply think, let alone say, the same about Russia. Nevertheless, this is possible in Nigeria. These "blasphemous" words were said by Achebe in connection with the fact that for 31 years now his country has been shaken by intercommunal and interreligious discords.

In Nigeria people speak 200 languages and dialects. The relations between the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo, its three major peoples constituting 60 percent of the population, are marked by unending conflicts. There are large tribes. However, there are also tribes who live in one or two villages. In the past, tattoos or marks on the face or chest of a Nigerian indicated to what tribe he belonged. Today people use several languages in their everyday life: one at home, another in the office, and yet another in the market.

The authorities tried to invent an artificial language, Guosa, that would suit everyone in Nigeria. However, nothing came out of this venture. A "Solomon's decision" was taken then. No language is considered official. In clerical work and business correspondence a person can use English, Hausa, Yoruba or Ibo at his choice.

The Christians, who obviously play a dominant part in the economy and in spreading the Western lifestyle in Nigeria, accuse the present administration of complicity with Moslems. They were particularly indignant at its decision to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1986. Any Christian will cite figures in support of his claims. Of Nigeria's seven presidents five came from the north, that is, they represented the feudal Moslem rulers in the north of the country. Today, of ten ministers only three are Christians. There are only five Christians among 17 directors-general of departments. In short, the Christians accuse the Moslems of all deadly sins.

Olubunmi Okogie, the Catholic archbishop of Lagos, urges the Christians to resist Moslem pressure. "You will see, there will be a fratricidal war," M.Dama, a Roman Catholic priest assured me. "The Christians feel that they have been brought to bay."

Discontent, stirred up from above, is manifested in Christian demonstrations under the slogan "No to forced Islamization." Religious motives were the mainspring of the putsch staged by junior officers in April of 1990. The putsch ended in failure. Despite requests from Catholic dignitaries "papa" Babangida took drastic measures: 42 persons were sentenced by a military tribunal to death. In general, putsches are common for Nigeria. Seven coup attempts were made during 30 years of existence of the state. Local political scientists are concerned about the danger of coups. A group of less than 100 conspirators with only one million dollars almost overthrew the government of the country with a 100 million population.

The Moslems, who are proud of the fact that Nigeria is one of the most ancient countries of Islamic civilization (the first hadj of a Nigerian to Mecca was made in 1124), accuse the Christians of the "superiority complex," extremism, cosmopolitism, and the lack of patriotism.

What about the government? Babangida stresses that personal qualities, not religious belief, are the only criterion in the appointment of people to high posts in the administration. When Islamic fundamentalists tried to organize riots in the state of Bauchi, Babangida, a devout Moslem himself, ordered troops to deal cruelly with the rebels.

The two "tame parties" will hardly be able to keep the country from an economic ruin and clashes on religious grounds. The military are like a "hoop" tying up Nigeria as a single whole. Babangida is sure that under any circumstances he and his friends-generals will be able to hold the country under their control.

If Dodo allows, of course.

Yakov Borovoi,
our special correspondent
ABEOKUTA-LAGOS-MOSCOW
Photos by author

NEW TIMES INTERVIEW

Oleg Gordievsky:

The death sentence is a reward for me

The former Soviet intelligence officer and a double agent of the British Intelligence Service meets *New Times'* **Lev YELIN,** leaving his usual disguise wig and makeup at home

Oleg Gordievsky was making a brilliant career in the KGB. After several missions abroad he was appointed Soviet resident in London. In May 1985 Gordievsky was summoned to Moscow – allegedly to discuss a new appointment. What actually awaited him in Moscow was a KGB inquiry. Even today Gordievsky cannot understand how the KGB found out that he had been an English spy for more than ten years.

After a series of interrogations, the traitor was kept under a rigid KGB surveillance, but he disappeared mysteriously only to turn up in Britain some time later. The KGB had a hard time surviving this loss of face. The Gordievsky family seemed to have no chance to ever visit Britain and meet Oleg.

At that time *New Times* wrote about the Gordievsky case from the viewpoint of human rights. Lord Nicholas Bethell used *New Times* to call for reunification of the Gordievsky family.

In September 1991 the new KGB chief, Vadim Bakatin, opened the cage in which Leyla Gordievskaya and her two daughters had spent nearly six years. Shortly after that Gordievsky and Bethell met them at Heathrow.

Oleg Gordievsky agreed to grant an interview to *New Times* at Lord Bethell's place in London. The meeting started with Gordievsky's producing several papers out of his briefcase and spreading them on the table before me.

"Top secret. Copy One. To the station heads. Enclosed hereby are planning of and organizational instructions for work of the Service and foreign stations... Comrades Gornov (Gordievsky's codename. – **L.Y.**), Brown, Yelin attention,'!.."

"Top secret. To the station heads. Attention Comrade Yelin." At the bottom of the paper there was a signature, which did not look like mine though...

"When I read your articles in *New Times,*" Gordievsky said, "I was very much surprised. I wondered whether that Yelin had popped up in *New Times.*"

Oleg Gordievsky wearing a wig, false beard and moustache

Yelin was the codename of a KGB analyst who worked for the London station in the late 1970s and up to 1984.

"He was a very good analyst," Gordievsky commented, "but he drank too much. He started drinking in the morning right where he worked: he did not fear anything knowing that he was very much valued... Later, however, that Yelin had a row with his new boss in Moscow. He was a little drunk and the boss was a convinced teetotaller, like Kryuchkov. Yelin was never appointed to London again after that. Since then there has not been a good analyst at the London station..."

After the situation with the two Yelins clarified, the interview began.

New Times. You are often seen on TV wearing a wig and makeup. I wouldn't have recognized you now from the pictures carried by the British papers. Do you think there is a real threat to your life?

Oleg Gordievsky. The KGB has an appropriate service that deals with defectors. The NKVD/KGB has long operated a special branch which specialized in killings before the war, organized the guerrilla movement during the war, and after the war trained agents-saboteurs who were to operate in hostile lands in the event of an international conflict. Oleg Lyalin who defected in 1971 used to be a member of that branch. Lyalin told the West everything he knew about it. Besides, it became clear that the branch was parallel to the similar branches in the army and that in the event of a nuclear conflict no sabotage would be needed, so the branch was dissolved. It was stripped of its independent status and transferred to a small section of Department S.

However, after the branch played an important role in the killing of Amin in Afghanistan and in connection with the general worsening of the international situation, its significance grew considerably.

In January 1985 General Yury Drozdov who was responsible for that branch too made several characteristic requests to me. I was summoned to Moscow then, because there were serious plans to appoint me head to the Soviet intelligence station in London. Drozdov asked me to collect informa-


КОМИТЕТ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ СССР
УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ № 3406
Петрович
старшего помощника начальника отдела

tion about mysterious and unresolved killings in Britain; to obtain light bullet-proof vests, to send films about British special purpose units. The films were to be used as training aids. They were clearly planning terrorist actions in 1985...

On the other hand, I can understand your doubts: there have been no political assassinations for 35 years, except the KGB's direct or indirect assistance to the Bulgarians (the assassination of Georgy Markov in the late 1970s with the help of a KGB-manufactured poisoned umbrella) and the East Germans.

N.T. Then why the wig, the makeup, the mystery?

O.G. You know, one doesn't feel nice when one knows that one's death may be being planned... As for the wig and the makeup... I am not hiding from the KGB, the KGB has my photos. I am hiding from the neighbours: if they knew who I am, they would start talking to the press. The press would mention my address. The KGB would send agents to record my timetable, as had been the case with Georgy Markov. They would know every move I make. Why take such risks?

Now it's about over. One journalist has already located me, another has reported which school my children would go to... It is becoming meaningless to hide.

N.T. May I take a picture of you – without the disguise?

O.G. Let's wait until I have taken the final decision.

N.T. I would like you to specify when you started collaborating with the British Intelligence. The KGB Public Relations Department says it was in 1972, you claim it was in 1974...

O.G. Some people are already saying it was in 1968. KGB is very paranoic at times. Sometimes they imagine fantastic things. There have been several articles, for instance, claiming that some secret agents were disclosed after my defection. It's nonsense. In 1970-72 in Moscow I really was responsible for secret agents stationed abroad, but I did not know any concrete facts about them. In 1966-69, I supervised Soviet secret agents in Scandinavia. I smuggled them on board of Leningrad-bound ships, I did all kinds of tricks with the passports. But I did not collaborate with the British Intelligence until the end of 1974, and the British Intelligence did not know anything about those secret agents! When the KGB disclosed me as a British agent, they started to think I had been spying for Britain since I was a student. They started blaming me for everything that had happened to any secret agent since the 1960s.



"Top secret. Attention Comrade Yelin..." It was a wrong Yelin, naturally

N.T. So, it was the end of 1974...

O.G. In 1968, after the invasion to Czechoslovakia, I decided that something had to be done against the system. I had become a convinced dissident, and I wanted to do something practical.

N.T. After you had been summoned to Moscow and interrogated, when you were under surveillance in Moscow, didn't your British friends suspect that you had gone over to the KGB side?

O.G. The British trusted me. Even in the initial stage of our cooperation they told me about how their state machine functioned, they shared important information helping me forget my last prejudices against the West. When I came to Britain, I was met like an old friend.

N.T. You must have tried hard to be appointed to London.

O.G. Yes, that's right.

N.T. How is this done in the KGB? High career intrigues? Dinners at expensive restaurants?

O.G. The main difficulty was that for many years I had no opportunity to study English properly. I studied German, Swedish, Danish, French. What principle was at work? For example, some secret agents were disclosed in Argentina in 1970 or 1971. I had met them in Scandinavia. I was already working at Moscow Centre and did not know a thing about their failure. The KGB leadership always believed that once arrested a secret agent would spill the beans. The heroic image of the Soviet intelligence officer is for the press only... This means, that if you met a contact once in Copenhagen, and the contact was arrested, then the contact would describe you and the enemy would know that you, Gordievsky, were a KGB man. Someone, incidentally, told me that I had been exposed. I was told to start studying French to be appointed to Algeria or Morocco.

Then a new boss came and told me: "To hell with it, after all we've all been exposed." He took me to the section responsible for Britain and Scandinavia. Soon I attend English language courses. Then the KGB started having a problem finding the right person to be appointed to London. I set about offering my services.

N.T. So you came to Britain without inviting any big boss for a dinner? Excuse me, but I can hardly believe it...

O.G. No, of course not. I invited Grushko to my place. Grushko later became a Deputy Chairman of the KGB and he is in prison now. (Grushko is accused of having been involved in the August coup. – **Ed.**) Mikhail Lyubimov, a colleague of mine, advised me to invite Grushko to my place to celebrate the birth of my baby.

N.T. May I ask you how much the British paid you? Were there any accounts in London or Zurich?

O.G. The British told me: we will pay you, if you want. I said that I worked out of conviction, and I did not need any payment. That was all, there was no talk of money after that. Later, in the middle of our cooperation they said: you had refused to be paid, but last month we decided to give you a modest allowance as part of your future pension. They continued this practice for several years. That's all. It was quite a disinterested cooperation, especially in the beginning when I was a great idealist.

Then I started thinking about my future. In 1980 and 1981 my children were born. However, I was in Moscow at that time and could not change anything anyway. In 1982, I told the British that things started looking dangerous for me, and if it came to a disclosure, I would have to stay in the West.

N.T. Are you a rich man as a result of what you have done?

O.G. I am comfortably well-off. I used all the money on my account to buy a house (Gordievsky owns a house that is quite ordinary by the British standards but looks like a palace to a Soviet, its price is $150,000. – **L.Y.**)

N.T. You are a consulting editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security. Is that your main stable source of income now?

O.G. It is my stable title. Besides the modest pension that I receive, my incomes come from books and articles I write (Gor-



Gordievsky drew this map of London showing the dead letter boxes the KGB used before 1985. One dead letter box was at the base of a tree to the left of a statue of St.Francis of Assisi in Holy Trinity Church

dievsky's first book written in cooperation with Christopher Andrew became a bestseller. – **L.Y.**). Plus I get some money as a consultant. For example, an American corporation may invite me for a couple of days to give lectures to its staff.

N.T. Your numerous interviews, articles and two books don't explain some things in your history. It is unclear, for example, how you crossed the border in 1985 when you escaped from the KGB.

O.G. I have my own opinion on what may be told and what may not, but there is also the British government's unwillingness to disclose some details. Anyway, I can say that the KGB claims are utter nonsense. They invented a version themselves and circulated it by their agent, Victor Louis, at the end of 1985. According to them a minivan picked me up in a Moscow street and took me to the British Embassy. Then at night, I was taken out in a diplomatic car ("like in a tin," the KGB Public Relations Centre said. – **L.Y.**) This is nonsense.

Actually, I got on a train headed westwards. I spent the whole night on the train. Then I had to walk through a forest for half a day to the border.

In one town near the border, I came to a café. Soon after that a group of men came in too. They were obviously a KGB general surveillance team. I immediately attracted their attention. It was two hours before the time when I was to cross the border. I finished my meal, went out and walked in the direction opposite of the border to demonstrate that I did not need anything near the border. After some twenty minutes I looked back and there was no one following me...

Several hours later I was out of the USSR and soon after that I was airlifted to Britain.

N.T. This means that you acted according to a certain plan...

O.G. I had a contingency plan worked out in 1977, and it awaited implementation for eight years. Naturally, it was constantly improved on.

N.T. To know the exact hour of border crossing, you had to contact the British at the very last moment (you said there were two hours left before the scheduled time).

O.G. ...

N.T. The impression is that it was the border with Finland.

O.G. ...

N.T. Are you still cooperating with those for whom you have worked for over ten years?

O.G. I do not cooperate with the British Intelligence any more. I used to work for them in the first one or two years, preparing various analyses. Now I am an independent person. I can teach, or do business, or write books.

N.T. Have you instructed British secret agents, or taught at the British training schools for spies?

O.G. Well, actually no British spy school can be compared to the KGB facilities. The KGB was a mammoth machine. I once wrote that 12,000 people worked for the First Chief Directorate (intelligence) of the KGB. The recently revealed figure is even greater – 16,000. And there is also the immense machine of the GRU (the military intelligence). In democratic states, except the United States, intelligence and counterintelligence services are very small. In Britain, the Intelligence Service is a very small department. It is very modest, very poor and very restricted in its activities by legislation. When I say that the Andropov KGB Institute trains 300 people a year for the KGB First Chief Directorate, no one in the West believes me. Actually, there are no training schools for spies in Britain. There are some courses – a couple of months of training – that's all.

Naturally, I sometimes lecture there.

N.T. As an expert on the KGB, did you warn the British about the possibility of a coup in the USSR?

O.G. I wrote an article (published in *The Sunday Times* on January 6, 1991) warning about a coup. Many publications, including your *New Times*, did the same. I was simply lucky to get a good tribune. I saw that the Soviet administrative system, including the KGB, the army, the military-industrial complex, would some time clash with democratization and liberalization. There was also a visible shift to the right. Kryuchkov & Co who had initially spoken about cooperation with the CIA, suddenly lost all interest in such cooperation. Why do any business with the enemy, they said. People started saying that Saddam Hussein was not actually that bad... Many people here believed what I said in my article. Another factor was that in the past 5 to 6 years the West, especially Britain and the US, started to understand the Soviet Union much better, not without my help, I am proud to note. I worked hard, making speeches, publishing KGB documents.

N.T. Once in his interview to *New Times* Kryuchkov said the KGB cooperated with the Western intelligence services in combatting terrorism and preventing of assassinations, etc. Is this true, or was Kryuchkov only serving the time?

O.G. In the years I worked for the KGB, the counterintelligence from time to time sent telegrames to the station head: please instruct the embassy security officer (and in case there was no security officer, the consular department head – usually consular officers were either KGB confidants or agents, or simply had good contacts) to meet a representative of the local police force and convey the following information to him... The information was normally

about planned terrorist attacks, but... But there was almost never any information about the really dangerous terrorist groups, like the Red Brigades or Rote Armee Fraktion. Since the Rote Armee Fraktion was controlled by East German Stasi, the KGB pretended to know nothing about it. The British, for example, were interested in the information about the terrorists in the Irish Republican Army. The KGB did not help them but there was a feeling that since they struggled against British imperialism, there was no use making trouble for them...

N.T. What did the KGB really informed Western security services about?

O.G. As a rule, it was information about the Arab groups which the KGB viewed as hostile – most Arab factions were seen as friendly ones, while the bad ones were those opposing the communists or Arafat. The KGB also informed about the Armenian factions planning attacks against the Turks.

N.T. Some KGB defectors are now trying to get their cases reviewed and sentences cancelled. Are you also thinking about it or do you think that your long cooperation with the British intelligence makes such steps impossible? Is it more difficult for you to prove that you had been a dissident too?

O.G. I regard the persecutions in the USSR, the death sentence as a reward rather than discrimination. The best people of Russia have either been shot or driven to exile. When they sentenced me to death, they made me one of the best people of Russia. It would be a pity if the sentence is repealed. I am not going to send any appeals. I have always known how indoctrinated the Soviet people are. I have always believed that I will only be understood by a new generation in a new Russia. The amount of understanding, however small, which can be observed in some articles makes me very happy. This is quite enough for me and I am not going to demand full rehabilitation.

N.T. Do you really think rehabilitation is possible?

O.G. In Czecho-Slovakia, for example, people who had cooperated with the West are regarded as national heroes and are invited to return to explain the new regime how to do business with the West, to help establish contacts. This is what I call real democracy. I have visited Czecho-Slovakia, by the way. I have visited 25 countries in the past few years, but Czecho-Slovakia is Number One. It is also an example for me what they have done to their secret services. And what is happening in the former Union...

The cards have been reshuffled many times but not a single one has fallen from on the table. The KGB remains the same. Its new chief, Primakov, has said that all KGB officers working abroad as journalists would be recalled, but no such journalist has returned so far.

N.T. You told me the names of journalists working abroad, who are actually KGB people. But they are all exposed as such...

O.G. When Lyalin defected in 1971 and when Nosenko defected in the 1960s, it was viewed as a catastrophe. Those whom Nosenko and Lyalin knew were immediately recalled. Later John Barron wrote his book "KGB" offering a long list of people associated with the KGB. Each of them had a special note attacked to his file: "Exposed in the Barron book". This meant that the bosses would think twice before sending them abroad. Then the number of defections, expulsions and books started to grow. Colonel Kutergin who had worked for West Germany for 17 years defected in 1984. He is not very public now, he prefers to keep a low profile. But he has worked for the West longer than anyone else.

These failures gradually taught the KGB that if people were to be recalled after each defection or exposure, soon there will not be enough personnel to send abroad...

N.T. Someone told me that the sign making a KGB agent visibly different from an ordinary diplomat or journalist was a good car. Besides, journalists associated with the KGB come to the embassy at 9:00. Is that so?

O.G. That's not wrong. Not all diplomats are privileged to have a car, but a KGB agent has to have one. If he has to take the driving lessons, he is immediately given money for such lessons.

It is not necessary for all journalists working for the KGB to report to the embassy at 9:00. That's really too much. But they know they can't alienate themselves from the intelligence station they belong to. First, they have to write the reports all the time. Second, which makes our spies so different from the British, for instance, is that there are career considerations – they want their boss to see them. Otherwise, the station head would get angry: "Where is Comrade Ivan Ivanov? I haven't seen him lately." Someone would say: "Comrade Ivanov has no business in the embassy. He is a journalist..." "So who's going to work? He was sent here to work, not worry about his cover! I want him here every day at so much time!" The KGB men get specially nervous at 6:00 p.m. fearing that they may be summoned to the embassy. Indeed, the embassy closes at 6:00 and no journalist has any business there. When the clock strikes six they flee from their bosses. Some fail to do it and that's the end of them. It becomes absolutely clear that they are not journalists.

N.T. In your second book, *Instructions From the Centre*, I was most of all impressed by the secret KGB directives concerning "the programme for prevention of a nuclear attack from the West." I used to believe that when Soviet leaders spoke about the nuclear threat from the West, they were making purely propaganda gestures. It becomes clear from your book that the KGB leadership believed in the nuclear threat and instructed its mammoth intelligence machine accordingly.

O.G. The British and the Americans were shocked when I showed those documents to them. They could not imagine how paranoiac and ignorant the Soviet leaders were. In 1988, Kryuchkov spoke at a conference in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressing the Soviet diplomatic elite. Even at that time he continued to stress the necessity not to overlook a nuclear attack...

N.T. You also wrote that in the 1970s the KGB was worried about the West's attempts to sell low-quality grain to the USSR at inflated prices. The stations were required "to disclose such instances." The same was alleged by Kryuchkov shortly before the coup. The leaders were quite consistent in their paranoia... How did the intelligence staff reacted to such statements?

O.G. Even the most stupid officers of the station understood that such statements were utter nonsense. The grain worries were nonsense. And neither Britain nor the US ever planned a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. However, the assignment was to write a report every two weeks. The station head who was my boss at that time used to say that Centre was Centre and whatever Centre ordered had to be done. The bosses know better, he believed. Perhaps there was some deep political meaning to obvious stupidity?

We started looking for facts. It was a tough job... Luckily for us, the Americans started deploying cruise missiles. We could report the arrival of missiles, their location, deployment, etc... The KGB began sending coded messages actually based on newspaper material.

Then another stupid instruction came: Centre read about the reconstruction of some ports and interpreted it as a strategic construction programme aimed for a more effective transportation of reserves from the US in the event of a conflict with the USSR.

If an old motorway was repaired, or a new one was built, it was also reported as a preparation for war. The same was true of annual blood donation campaigns which were interpreted as preperatory measures for a nuclear attack.

N.T. You have finally reunited with your family after six years you spent away from them. Were the stubborn refusals of the Soviet authorities to let your wife and daughters go unexpected for you?

O.G. Actually, anything could be expected from those people. On the other hand, my case was brought up by Mrs. Thatcher, John Major, Presidents Reagan and Bush, to say nothing of the British Foreign Office and the US State Department leaders. These appeals had no influence on the KGB, or the Foreign Ministry, or Gorbachev, although their actions were a blatant violation of international human rights accords. By the way, people who for various reasons defected to the USSR from the US, Britain, Germany are regularly visited by their relatives and children...

N.T. How do your wife and daughters get along in Britain?

O.G. They are OK. The daughters go to school. Only once did we feel an echo of the old times. My wife went to the Soviet consular department to certify some document, the consul looked at her passport and said: do you know that you have a private visitor visa? If you get back to the USSR, you'll have to apply for the exit visa once again... She said she had a British resident alien visa and wondered if she could get a Soviet multiple exit visa. No, the consul said, you'll have to repeat the procedure over and over again...

This means a tremendous risk. What if they start harassing her for me again? Leyla was invited to attend the presentation of my book which will be published in Moscow in Juanuary. However, I still have doubts whether she should go.

Leyla has spent six years and two months under round-the-clock surveillance. Can you imagine that? There were constantly two or three cars to follow her round the clock for six years. Besides, her flat was bugged, as well as the flats of her brother, my sister and my parents, which makes it four flats. In old prices, the whole effort is worth 40 million rubles, and in new prices it's about 100 million. A great waste of money on watching a woman and two little children.

N.T. Do you have any friends in Russia?

O.G. I have some contacts, but people who had known me in the Foreign Ministry and the KGB are still afraid. There is a strong inner fear of any contacts with a traitor. Naturally, my wife found herself in terrible isolation. The wife of a traitor... The surveillance scared off everybody. Nonetheless, her two brothers, parents and several good friends stayed with her. There was also KGB Captain Fedotov – a wonderful person.

Fedotov was one of the technical staff in Britain. In 1985, he visited me in Moscow shortly before my escape – he came to cheer me up. He told me: "You understand, we are living in a totalitarian state." I was scared: the flat was bugged and Fedotov was running the risk of dismissal. They did fire him several months after my escape. Fedotov and his family continued to support my wife all these years. Fedotov is now the head of a cooperative. He is a talented man who can do anything. He is one of the people I want to have contacts with, to do good to.

N.T. What about new friends in Britain?

O.G. Initially, they included diplomats and intelligence people, retired nowadays – experts on Russia, Poland, Finland, Germany, China, Czecho-Slovakia, Bulgaria – people with a similar background. Now I have a new very good circle of friends – the people from the Russian Service of the BBC, such as Vladimirov, Novgorodtsev.

N.T. How do you see your future?

O.G. I don't have any grand plans. I think I'll write a book of reminiscences. What I really like to do is to write reviews of books on Soviet affairs. I have published a review on Gorbachev's latest book, Vaksberg's book about Vyshinsky, Volkogonov's books and the book by George Blake. I feel writing reviews is my vocation...

FROM OLEG GORDIEVSKY'S FILE

Instruction of the KGB First Chief Directorate (Intelligence) On Certain National Psychological Peculiarities of the Chinese and the Use of Such Pecularities in the Intelligence

No. 822/PR/62
September 13, 1976

To the Station Heads

The Chinese authorities instruct Chinese representatives abroad that the Soviet intelligence makes an extensive use of alcohol as a means of recruiting new agents. In this connection there is little use in offering hard liquor to Chinese in order to make them talk, because a mere mention of vodka evokes the Chinese representatives' fears of recruiting and only confirms their faith in the correctness of the warnings they got in Beijing or the Chinese embassy.

In our opinion, it makes sense to treat Chinese to high-quality tea, fruit juices, cakes, chocolates or delicacy sandwiches. Taking into account the fact that Chinese representatives abroad usually have very modest menu, to say nothing of the very limited selection of choice foods, such treatment can produce a favourable reaction. The Chinese' suspicions to a Soviet person may be weakened, and even replaced by sumpathy, if there is a calm relaxed conversation on everyday matters without any emphasis on the ideological matters or professional problems. Naturally, all expectations will be exceeded if the host "happens" to have some Chinese treat, like jasmin tea, peanuts, soyabean sauce, etc., or some Chinese articles, like a calendar printed in China, some Chinese-manufactured tableware, an album of Chinese landscapes, or a Chinese picture.

The Chinese are very particular about foreigners' attitude to the Chinese women. A foreigner may not take a Chinese woman by the hand, or make any ambiguous jokes or compliments on the woman's appearance, since nothing of this is in the Chinese tradition.

Mixed marriages are regarded as a disgrace in China, to say nothing about a woman's brief affair with a foreigner. Nonetheless, before the beginning of The Great Leap the Chinese women were not too moral in their relations with foreigners, provided the circumstances allowed that. They used to give a special preference to the representatives of the countries which are officially viewed by Beijing as "more revolutionary," Albania, for example.

As for Chinese men, examples show that when they have to spend a long time on a business trip abroad away from their wives, they sometimes ignore the principles and have affairs with foreign women.

Yeltsin's security monster

The Constitutional Court will soon have to pass its verdict on the dispute between the President of Russia and the Russian parliament concerning the Yeltsin-proposed merger of police and security forces

It is for the second time already that the Constitutional Court of Russia will have to decide which side is right: the President or the parliament. It is also for the second time that the controversy has arisen over a national security issue. The first apple of discord was the Chechen city of Grozny where the President imposed a state of emergency to protect the constitution. At that time the parliament took the upper hand and the presidential decree was cancelled. This time the constitutional Court is to decide to what extent the proposed merger of the Russian and USSR Interior Ministries, the Inter-Republican Security Service and Russia's Federal Security Agency into an integrated service will promote the national security interests of the country. So far the problem has evoked heated controversy. The Intelligence Service is in a state of utter confusion and chaos, while the prevailing opinion in the Interior Ministry of Russia is in favour of a merger.

On December 26 the Supreme Soviet of Russia unanimously voted for the proposal to merge the Interior Ministry and the former KGB. The parliament refused to recognize Minister Barannikov's arguments in favour of the merger as being convincing. On the day after the parliamentary defeat, heads of the Interior Ministries of Russia and the USSR, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Federal Security Agency convened at the Interior Ministry of Russia to discuss the situation. According to witnesses, Interior Minister Barannikov stressed that the nation had grown weary of *perestroika* and that successful reforms could only be promoted by the use of force. In the same speech Barannikov is reported to have promised to "deal" with those who opposed or worked against the merger.

The opposition is first and foremost composed of members of the parliamentary committees for legislation, legality, human rights and security. These committees were first to give a legal and juridical assessment of the Yeltsin decree and to remind the nation of the tragic history of police and security forces acting under one umbrella.

Similar mergers were carried out in 1932, 1940, 1948 and 1953 (the last was not accomplished – after Stalin's death. Beria tried to set up a unified Interior Ministry, but he had too little time.) In all the other cases, the mergers were followed by massive repressions against dissidents and political opponents.

In all cases the repressive monsters were then divided again, and not because democratic tendencies in the country intensified. Quite simply, they started to threaten not only the population, but the totalitarian leadership as well.

It is also very probable that when they divided the integrated police and security service, the Soviet leaders also wanted to get rid of biased information about the situation in the country. In the United States, functions similar to those of the Interior Ministry and the KGB are performed by eleven different agencies. This makes it possible to get as objective information as posible. Moreover, the information supplied is more professional, since every department specializes in one particular field.

Second, a variety of law-enforcement agencies reduces the potential threat such bodies may constitute to democratic institutions. Even if such bodies enter into a conspiracy like the August plot in this country, such a conspiracy is easy to detect by the character of information they supply to the top – the information cannot be identical by virtue of its professional specificity.

Third, the division of powers makes it possible to avoid excesses and repressions. The Interior Ministry has always performed the police function of finding and arresting those who have already committed crimes. The task of a security service is to analyse and trace the processes that may result in a crime. Where is a guarantee that the new super-ministry will not be too fast in its analyses and not arrest people before the crime is actually committed?

Remarkably, the first to oppose the merger were officers of the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Federal Security Agency –evidently they remembered the lesson of 1932, when after the merger a great number of security officers, mostly analysts, were repressed and eliminated. Stalin had no use for objective analyses... It is obvious today that at least one group will run afoul of the new ministry's leadership – the KGB officers who controlled the Interior Ministry activities. The KGB revealed, for example, that about 75 percent of the USSR Interior Ministry officers were corrupt. For Russia, the figure of corrupt law-enforcers is lower – 52 percent. 380 Interior Ministry workers have been convicted, and over 2,300 fired in the past four years on the basis of KGB findings. Leaving aside the personal worries of former KGB officers, one cannot but wonder how the activities of the integrated ministry will be controlled on the level of practical efforts, not on the level of state or political interests.

There is one more argument that has prevented the parliament from a large-scale demolition of the law-enforcement structures. A service inquiry was carried out in the KGB after the coup. It has not produced any serious results or reshuffles in the KGB leadership. As is seen from the press, most KGB leaders have retained their positions and even received a promotion. It has proved difficult to find anything against the KGB generals, but the public has at least got a chance to have a peek into the KGB secrets, and to be informed that the majority of the KGB staff opposed the August coup.

No such investigation has been carried out in the Interior Ministry and the sentiments in there remain a secret. If the KGB and the Interior Ministry are merged, will this measure of the Russian leaders only make the traditionally secret departments even more closed to public scrutiny?

Finally, let us leave aside all pros and cons and ask the question that may soon emerge on the forefront: who needs a monopoly in law-enforcement?

Irina Filippova

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

The POW will live in Kabul

For many years, the problem of Soviet POWs has been dealt with sporadically. It was sometimes forgotten and POWs returned, one by one, and sometimes it attracted a great attention and created a lot of noise without any remarkable results. In the past month the opposition has discussed the POW problem with two mediators and one vice-president. The mediators were the American painter, Mikhail Shemyakin, and political observer of the Moscow paper *Trud*, Vladimir Snegiryov, who was also a member of the Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen-Internationalists under the President of the USSR. The official negotiations between Russia and the Afghan opposition were conducted by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi. The results of these negotiations have not been visible so far.

Soviet POWs in Afghanistan used to be exchanged for dollars and gasoline. Now Russia prefers a man-to-man talk to get its boys back

A trip to Afghanistan

The organizer and leader of the International Committee For the Rescue of Russian POWs in Afghanistan, founded in 1988 in the US, Mikhail Shemyakin, was beside himself with indignation when he came to Moscow from Pakistan. His indignation was a result of the frustrated negotiations with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the most influential leaders of the opposition. It was not really Shemyakin's fault, but the Russian side's. When he left for Islamabad, Shemyakin contacted Moscow (prior to the Commonwealth Treaty was signed) to find out whether any Soviet representative was going to visit the opposition. The head of the International Committee was assured no such negotiations were planned. Shemyakin proposed his own plan of actions after he crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border. He was to visit Hekmatyar, talk to him and then videotape the talk with six POWs located near Hekmatyar's base in Afghanistan. If this plan could have been carried out, the mothers of POWs would have got some consolation. Moscow knows the names of POWs held by the field commander, Ahmed Shah Masud and one of the resistance leader, Prof. Burnanuddin Rabbani, but it does not know anything about those held by Hekmatyar: the Hekmatyar group which holds the biggest number of Soviet POWs, keeps their names top secret. The video recording would have made it possible to reveal their names, to find out at least something about the conditions of their captivity and the state of their health.

The trip to Hekmatyar was not easy for Shemyakin. He could not have possibly presented himself as an American – he is too famous and his English leaves much to be desired. As for the history of his relations with the Soviet state, his expulsion from the USSR and the reasons why he had chosen to be preoccupied with the Soviet POWs' fate were not the things that could be easily explained to the Afghan opposition leader. Mikhail Shemyakin recalls the following episode: one night his car was stopped, everybody was ordered out, the translator was arrested, and then, unexpectedly, the car was allowed to proceed – a kind of night-time psychological test. After many such adventures, the Shemyakin group finally made it to the Hekmatyar base in the province of Paktia...

Hekmatyar had bad news for them: it was impossible to meet the POWs – he was going to Pakistan to meet Vice-President of Russia Alexander Rutskoi.

The dissapointed and enraged Shemyakin had no choice but to return to Pakistan.

Soviet weapons in Kabul: the arms supplies stopped on January 1, but how much Soviet-made materiel is still in Afghanistan?

Photo from Time

In Masud's camp

The second trip to Afghanistan, to field commander Ahmed Shah Masud was more successful. For the first time two British and one Soviet journalists crossed the Soviet border into the Mujahedin-controlled territory of Afghanistan (when they came back, the USSR no longer existed). The intention of the trip was more than just videotaping of the talk with POWs.

The British journalist Peter Jouvenal who was the leader of the group has met Masud for tens of times. His recent trips have been patronized by Lord Nicholas Bethell, Member of the European Parliament, and the British House of Lords. For several times, Peter Jouvenal brought letters from the Soviet POWs held by Masud to their relations in the USSR. This time, however, Lord Bethell had a quite concrete plan.

Field commander Ahmed Shah Masud has always played his own game in Afghanistan. An educated and clever man, Masud virtually controls the three Afghan provinces that separate Kabul from the Commonwealth. On his orders the Mujahedin can block or open the Salang Pass – the main transport route leading to Kabul. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet troops twice concluded a ceasefire with Masud. Masud also provided for a more or less peaceful withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan (rumours have it that Masud regretted this: after they pulled out, Soviet troops shelled the Masud positions, while the most irreconcilable opposition factions condemned him for collaboration with the occupiers). The names of the POWs held by Masud and his subordinates are known.

The Lord Bethell plan was as follows: Masud was not opposed to the idea of establishing contacts with the Russian leadership before the talks with the Mujahedin in Moscow. If President Yeltsin addressed Masud with a letter confirming Russia's preparedness to establish relations, and the Russian government would have supported that letter by sending gasoline to Masud, the field commander would have released the POWs. President Najibullah of Afghanistan would not have been very offended by this gesture by Russia: the Kabul leader has known the field commander for a long time and their people even had some commercial relations between them. By the way, Najibullah and Masud used to go to one and the same school. The would-be President of Afghanistan was stronger and often beat Masud – then.

The Mujahedin keep asking for maps of minefields – people continue to get killed there. Is Najibullah the only one who has the maps?

Photo from Time

Boris Yeltsin did write a letter to Masud, but he attached one condition to it: the letter was to be handed over to the field commander only in case he started speaking about concrete terms of the POWs' release. There was no talk about gasoline however. Although no POWs were released, the journalists' mission could be described as successful. For the first time in eight-ten years the POWs relations in the USSR could see their sons' weary faces on the screen and hear them say: "Wait for me, I'll be back soon."

Masud was offended when he was not invited to participate in the November talks in Moscow. The feelings of the master of three provinces are easy to understand. However, Masud is a realist and Lord Bethell's plan may work some time. The price of POWs will be more than just gasoline, but there had been cases when POWs were exchanged for thousands of dollars each.

One shouldn't get angry in the East

Naturally, neither Shemyakin's nor the journalists' mission attracted as much attention as that of Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi. Besides, it is always more interesting for journalists to report scandals, and scandals are something that was not in short supply during the Rutskoi trip.

The Vice-President's journey included Teheran, Lahore, Islamabad and Kabul. The impression is that when he arrived in Teheran, Alexander Rutskoi was inspired by the successful accords with the Afghan opposition reached in Moscow: in other words, he came prepared to take the POWs along with him. However, there were no POWs in Teheran, and the opposition was not really inclined to discuss the POWs, preferring instead to discuss matters relating to the political settlement in Afghanistan. It must be noted that in the Moscow accords the humanitarian problem of POWs was included in the political package for the first time. Previously, the negotiators (the Soviet side at least) tried to separate these two spheres of international and interstate relations.

In Teheran, Alexander Rutskoi got no POWs and became very angry. Journalists who entered the negotiations room shortly before the talks were over, witnessed the Vice-President's anger: the door of the room was left open and the journalists thought the meeting was already over. This was the first scandal. Later, apparently under the pressure of the Iranian leadership interested in dialogue with the new Moscow leaders, the representatives of the Afghan opposition promised to exchange one Lithuanian and one Azerbaijani for Mujahedin POWs held in Kabul. It sounded like a sensation. When asked by *New Times* in Moscow after his trip, Rutskoi however specified that the two were not captured servicemen, but just two boys born in 1973 who were too young to have fought in Afghanistan. They had simply crossed the border into Afghanistan, were captured and realized that there was no place like home soon after the romantic intoxication evaporated.

After Iran, Rutskoi left for Pakistan where he had even more difficult talks with the Peshawar opposition. If in Iran he had to deal only with representatives of the Afghan Islamic Unity Party, in Islamabad his partners at the bargaining table included five resistance leaders out of the Peshawar Seven. Even the irreconcilable Hekmatyar, who had previously refused to recognize the Moscow accords, came to negotiate. It is difficult to say whether they refused to negotiate together or thought that a private chat with the Russian Vice-President would be more effective, but Rutskoi had to deal with them one by one. The resistance leaders drove up to the building, were ushered into different rooms, so as to exclude the possibility of a chance meeting and then had

private talks with Rutskoi. It was only once that they came together: for a ten minute spell at the end of the negotiations. Evidently, they convened to share and support the Vice-President's opinion that the war in Afghanistan had to be stopped as soon as possible and that it was necessary to elect an Islamic government with no delay.

There was no dispute about what the Mujahedin and Rutskoi understood under the term of Islamic government – the word was there, and its content could be debated later on. Meanwhile, the opposition was strongly opposed to the idea of Najibullah's Fatherland Party taking part in the elections. It was only a month ago that Moscow tended to endorse the UN settlement plan under which the former People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was to participate in the new government. The Afghan side formally consented (without going into details) to the Rutskoi proposal that pending the elections a temporary commission be set up including representatives of all parties, tribal leaders and elders on the Afghan side, and representatives of the neighbouring states, including some former Soviet republics. In principle, such a commission can be set up, of course, it is also possible to attach a UN status to it, as Rutskoi suggested. However, this plan looks doubtful to many experts who point out that first the opposition leaders have to agree between themselves at least on the election procedure.

When about six months ago Rutskoi stated that Russia could play an independent role in the Afghan settlement, this sincere and reasonable desire (after all the thirteen-year old Afghan war has to be ended somehow) could be explained by the confrontation between Yeltsin's Russia and Gorbachev's federal centre. The Yeltsin White House wanted to achieve an independent success on the Afghan issue, thus overstripping the Kremlin. Now when there is no federal centre, there is a real danger that the Soviet diplomatic experience with Afghanistan will be forgotten. It would be stupid to repeat all the errors of the Kremlin. The problem cannot be solved after some hours of negotiating. It looks like Russia has to make a choice what attitude to the Kabul regime it should assume. Russia's attitude to Kabul remains unclear: when Rutskoi spoke to journalists aboard the Islamabad-bound plane, he said that Najibullah could not be ignored. As soon as he uttered these words, his press-secretary, People's Deputy of Russia Iona Andronov, asked the journalists not to emphasize the Vice-President's words and his reference to Kabul.

Actually, it is not clear why Andronov issued that warning. If no final decision has been taken so far, it's high time to think about it. If there is a double play under way, then it is necessary to remember that in the case with the Afghan situation any double play will inevitably lead to a big scandal and utter defeat.

Despite the Iran-based Mujahedin's unwillingness to give the POWs away, in Islamabad the Russian representatives insisted on the observance of the Moscow accords. Rutskoi's insistence is quite understandable: a liberated POW would be a concrete result of his trip. Besides, as a man known for absolute sincerety of his words and deeds, Rutskoi really wanted to make life easier at least for one POW.

Two complications arose in this connection. First, Hekmatyar suggested that Rutskoi meet with one of the POWs – Nikolai Vyrodov. Had the Vice-President previously studied the POW problem, the name would have been familiar to him. Even before the POWs were officially amnestied after much pressure from various public committees, the press carried reports about a Ukranian who had defected to the rebels, served as military instructor for Hekmatyar and then formed his own armed group and successfully fought against the Soviet troops. Had Rutskoi known all that he would not have been surprised to hear Vyrodov refuse to return home and answer in the affirmative when someone at the news conference asked him whether he had personally killed any Soviet soldiers.

The second episode was more tricky. When the Vice-President's plane was about to leave for Kabul, Rutskoi was informed that the president of the provisional mujahedin government in Peshawar, Mojaddidi, instructed one of his field commanders to release one of the POWs. The departure for Kabul had to be postponed and the Russian delegation started waiting for the POW. The field commander brought Habibullah, son of Babak Qool, a Turkmen by nationality, to the Russian delegation. Besides, the Russian delegation was also given a letter describing the circumstances of Habibullah's becoming a POW. The letter was taken by Iona Andronov. The POW was put on the plane and the delegation left for Kabul.

When the plane was already airborne, it turned out that Habibullah was not a Soviet POW, but an Afghan Turkmen who was taken prisoner in 1990 when the Soviet troops had already left Afghanistan. Actually, all this was written in the letter.

Why Najibullah is so self-confident

The situation was quite ambiguous, but President Najibullah stepped in time to correct it.

The Kabul leader was well-prepared for the talk with the Russian Vice-President. Several days before the Rutskoi visit Najibullah recognized the independence of Russia and on the day when he met with Rutskoi he announced the unconditional and unilateral release of 100 Mujahedin from the Kabul prisons. When Rutskoi found himself in a trying situation, Najibullah immediately offered his help. The Turkmen released by the Peshawar opposition would live in Kabul, Najibullah said, the Kabul government would provide housing, food and security for him, while the Russian government would pay for it, as long as the International Red Cross decided what to do with the Turkmen.

It seems that a day in Kabul strengthened Rutskoi's conviction that Najibullah was the man to do business with – he was trustworthy and reliable. The mutual sympathy was obvious. So far, no reaction from the opposition has been recorded.

When asked by *New Times* at the Moscow news conference, whether the release of the wrong prisoner could have been intentional, Rustkoi said:

"I have no reasons to question the sincerity and honesty of President Mojaddidi. He was deceived by his own people. The POW was brought right to the plane and there was no time to check whether he was the right person."

During his trip Rutskoi received help not from Najibullah alone, but from the governments of Iran and Pakistan as well. The Iranian and Pakistani leaders seem to be weary of the years-long civil war in Afghanistan, and, like Rutskoi, they agree that the situation in Afghanistan has to be settled as soon as possible, and only by political means.

The Vice-President of Russia also conducted separate talks with Iranian and Pakistani representatives. One of the issues discussed was military cooperation. Iona Andronov later specified that the point of discussion was limited to Iran's debt for Soviet arms supplies and very general prospects of possible military cooperation between Russia and Pakistan without any concrete proposals. It is difficult to say whether Russia can afford discussing such things in the current situation in the Commonwealth, and it is as difficult to foresee the possible international reaction to such cooperation. One thing is clear, though: back in Moscow, the Vice-President will have to look into the details of some other form of military cooperation. According to Western media, on December 17, the day when Rutskoi left for Teheran, a Commonwealth member supplied Kabul with 137 tanks. This information has yet to be confirmed, and Rutskoi promised journalists he would look into the matter.

During the negotiations, there was one funny episide too. In Lahore, where the Russian delegation was meeting the Pakistanis, Rustkoi was presented by a couple of two green parrots. The Vice-President was assured that those were a male and a female. However, the parrots started fighting as soon as the cage was taken aboard. An expert has to be sent for to the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad to make sure the parrots really belonged to different sexes. After some time, an expert was found who inspected the birds and said they were really a male and a female. He said they were fighting because they had to adapt to each other. The parrots had to travel with Rutskoi in their cage wrapped in a blanket. They did not fight in the dark.

Irina Lagunina

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Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

Like any totalitarian state, the Nazi *Weltanschauungstaat* needed and demanded a philosophy that could support its established social and political order. The official philosophy was to cement ideologically all segments of society under the all-penetrating Party rule. Though the German academic philosophy seemed to be rather compliant and loyal to the new authorities, the Nazis in power never approved of its "pure" philosophical stance. One of the constant elements of the cultural policy and of the "shaping of mind" in the Third Reich was that of discrediting academic philosophy and its traditions, and of restricting its influence. The principal goal of the Nazi regime in this sphere was the elimination of academic autonomy and freedom of thought. The Queen of Sciences in Nazi times had no chance to be or pretend to be independent and disengaged. Philosophizing could be allowed only as a functional element of the official ideology. And should any science seem unable or unwilling to perform this function, there would be no place for it at all. If even physics could be divided into the good Arian science and the bad one, dominated by the "enemies of the Reich," this was even more true for such a *Weltanschauung* discipline as philosophy.

The paper written in the late 1960s by Polish sociologist Stanislaw Tyrowicz provides interesting views on the nature of totalitarian society and its intellectual life. The article also suggested several clear allusions to the situation in countries under the Communist rule. We continue the publication of

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Stanislaw Tyrowicz's essay from *NT* 1/92 issue. The previous installment dealt with the "truly German philosophy" and the concept of the "meaning of history."

German philosophy in the Nazi times

Stanislaw Tyrowicz

A few years before the advent of the Nazi dictatorship a symptomatic incident took place in German academic life. A group of professors concluded that they may not lecture in one of the rooms in Heidelberg University, where the nationalistically-minded students placed the slogan: "German science is to be cultivated here." They refused to lecture there, arguing that science by its very nature is international and supranational, since otherwise it is not science. But the incident occurred still before 1933. After that year only "German science" was to be cultivated in all fields, and its international and supranational connections came to be destroyed systematically.

Philosophical heritage and philosophical consciousness. In philosophy that ethnocentric trend was first manifested in the policy of eliminating all those approaches which were considered "alien" or "un-German." Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, rationalism and empiricism, logical positivism and Marxism – all of a sudden proved un-German. It also turned out that the attitude toward the heritage of classical German philosophy can become an important issue for philosophers, and even the subject matter of a violent controversy. That controversy was not, of course, related to the essential philosophical problems formulated by Kant and Hegel. The parties in the dispute were now divided into those who claimed that the Kantian and Hegelian heritage is not an obstacle to restoring to German philosophy its German national character, and even can help such a restoration, and those who asserted that that heritage must inevitably weaken and even undermine that process.

It is significant that it was precisely the issue of the "attitude" toward tradition which resulted in a differentiation in the ranks of the German philosophers active in the period opened by the political events in 1933. The same philosophers used to emphasize many a time that they were essentially in agreement in their opinions about "the present time." An overview of German philosophical literature in the period under consideration fully substantiates the opinion that out of the many problems discussed by academic philosophers in public only that of "agreeing upon" the proper attitude toward tradition was still giving rise to genuine discussions, which did not abate during the 12 years of the existence of the Third Reich. And the controversy was a heated one.

"Shall we drag with us into new, awakened Germany the shapeless mass of false philosophies and religions, that heritage of the deceitful history of nations and races?" a professor from Leipzig asked rhetorically, and answered: "No, by no means, no! The philosophical and *Weltanschauung* ideals and beliefs of mankind are a cemetery that can teach us only one lesson: we were wrong, we must build anew."

While launching a violent attack upon tradition and its defenders, one of the groups of the then German academic philosophers introduced into recent history a sharp division into periods. The previous epoch, crushed by the political events of 1933, was supposed to be separated from the new one, which had just begun, by the *ceasura* of a deep breakthrough *(Durchbruch)*. A breakthrough in philosophy was believed to have been announced by the symptoms of its exhaustion, sterility, and even complete bankruptcy. But the "breakthrough" was to derive its true origin from the superhuman vigour, unbending will and perspicacity of the leader and maker of new Germany. All other explanations of the causes of the "breakthrough" were pushed into the background. "National socialism takes its origin not from Fichte, but from Adolf Hitler," said Prof. A.Baeumler, when protesting firmly against those interpretations which obliterated the clearness and significance of the breakthrough.

"All our philosophers would have to philosophize in an essentially different manner if they had known what we do know today," wrote apodictically and in a grotesque manner Prof. W. Schultz, who taught "philosophy and the German *Weltanschauung*" in Munich University. The feeling of superiority over the philosophical self-knowledge of a Kant or a Hegel or a Fichte he drew from the "epochmaking" discovery that human thought in all its forms is determined by the racial characteristics of the man who thinks and by the nation to which he belongs. The truth, previously sought in vain, came to be known at last, and its discovery revealed "how unsatisfactory our reasons to be satisfied with the evolution of German philosophy to date are /.../." "When proceeding to shape a new image of the world the thinkers of the German future must remove the old one. Major or minor crises are unavoidable in the process."

Conclusion. For the beginning see No.1/92

Prof. Ernst Krieck, Rector of Heidelberg University, was a staunch supporter of the thesis about the "breakthrough" and of the opinion that German philosophy had a harmful influence upon the shaping of social consciousness. He used to repeat infinitely in his books and articles that philosophy could not render any services to national socialism, and hence was useless. "That which for 400 years has passed for philosophy is merely insane absurdity. Nothing should be assimilated from the philosophical heritage contaminated by Cartesius' fatal error." Krieck wanted philosophy to be replaced by national-political anthropology, an outline of which he expounded in a monstrous handbook of three volumes.

Krieck used to bring to the extreme the consequences of the racialist and political assumptions of the Nazi doctrine. Hence no German thinker, regardless of how many centuries before Krieck he happened to live, was found not guilty when brought before the tribunal of his criticism. There were no just ones before Hitler. In his article about Nicolaus of Cusa, a late German schoolman of the 15th century, Krieck wrote thus: "Today we cannot rest satisfied with problems of intellectual history and tradition. They have become a secondary issue, something superficial when compared with the principle of race. This is why we ask about life, about the blood that produces character and spirit, about the continuation of that spirit in German history." One can easily imagine the answers to such questions, which are to be found in the schoolman's works. Krieck accordingly concludes that the Cusan case "is grave" (*ein schwieriger Fall*), and the underdevelopment of his racialist and national consciousness is below all admissible standards.

In Germany at that time there were groups of philosophers who were not inclined to be in solidarity with such an attitude toward German philosophical heritage. They were frontally attacked by Franz Böhm, the author of *Anticartesianismus*, one of the few publications expressing the national socialist view of philosophy in a manner that comes closest to the principles of the doctrine. Böhm's accusation of traditional philosophizing includes seven principal points.

1. "Traditional philosophy" permanently shuns the "extraordinary" tasks with which the *Führer* has entrusted his nation. Philosophy at best can be found in some remote peripheries instead of marching in the front ranks.

2. Philosophy participated neither in awakening national consciousness nor in the decisions that brought about the advent of "the new epoch."

3. "Traditional philosophy" has proved incapable of overcoming the influence of rationalism, European syncretism, and eclecticism. Nor has it proved capable of freeing itself from ideas behind which there is no reality and empirical fact.

4. "Traditional philosophizing" does not aspire to new possibilities, but consists in restoring, in a manner devoid of any creative element, the past with its way of interpreting oneself and the world.

5. The breakthrough of 1933 has changed radically the situation of philosophy by letting it face a quite new obligation. He who pursues philosophy must comprehend that it is his duty to promote and to put into effect the ideas of real life.

6. Philosophy may not, as it has done so far, be concerned with itself. The importance it will enjoy in the future will depend solely on what it offers itself to that future.

7. Thinking as such lacks foundations and limits. Thought must be supported by faith, faith in the reality of the national community and its creative activity. That faith cannot be substantiated. Philosophical thought will lack foundation and support as long as it does not share that faith and does not become its vehicle.

Those accused of philosophizing "in the traditional way" did not believe themselves to be "traditionalists." While firmly emphasizing the differences separating their attitude toward German philosophical heritage from that which was preached by the "antitraditionalists," they formulated an alternative philosophical programme, adjusted to the situation in, and demands of, the national socialist state.

Böhm's aggressive article was provided by the editors of the periodical with a brief note, stating: "We are not continuators of a stale tradition, but we are also far from radically denying and foregoing that tradition. Those who, like Ernst Krieck and Franz Böhm, comprehend that a new historical epoch has begun*/.../ notice the advantages which contemporary German philosophy can derive from contacts with the great personalities in German philosophy. By drawing from the profound and ground-breaking heritage of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Nietzsche we keep incomparably closer contacts with the reality of German destiny than their comments would suggest."

The characteristic shifting of the controversy over tradition, as formulated in the editorial note, onto the plane of closeness to the reality of "German destiny;" the utilitarian emphasis on the advantages which "contemporary philosophy" can draw from assimilating the heritage; and the dissociation from "stale" tradition and understanding for the "new epoch" – all these are to be considered an adequate manifestation of the consciousness of a large part of the then academic philosophers in Germany.

The "antitraditionalists" demanded a formulation of national socialist philosophy from the scratch. The "traditionalists" were interested mainly in adjusting German philosophy to the need of the existing system

The differences between the attitudes of both philosophical groups came to be crystallized completely. The "antitraditionalists" demanded a formulation of national socialist philosophy from the scratch. But for the time being they believed that pulling down "the inherited shacks" and clearing the ground for the imposing building of the philosophy of the future had top priority.

The "traditionalists" thought otherwise. They were interested mainly in adjusting German philosophy to the need of the existing system. They did not think that calling to existence a quite new philosophy from the scratch, as if philosophy had never before existed in Germany, was necessary. Whereas the "antitraditionalists" tried to imagine: a) what national socialist philosophy should be like? b) what kind of philosophy ought to be formulated for the future (which would, of course, be a national socialist future)?, the "traditionalists" provided answers to other questions; they were interested in the problems: a) how to adjust German philosophy to the needs of the national socialist state? b) how to make German philosophy acceptable to national socialism and capable of functioning in the national socialist system?

The former group stressed the necessity of originating a new stage in the history of philosophy (*neuer Anfang*) and brought out the category of "breakthrough" (*Durchbruch*), and the latter group interpreted the category of "breakthrough" in a different sense and claimed that the national socialist stage in the history of German philosophy was a continuation of its age-old distinctive generic characteristics. Both groups incessantly referred to history, but the past meant different things for them. In his *Anticartesianismus* Böhm admitted that he clearly "was instinctively mistrustful" of all conceptions drawn from history. He claimed that the future, and not the past, ought to be the system of reference. The past, systematically overestimated, was called by him "the burden that paralysed the will to act and hindering the determined march toward the future." For us the future is not only the sense of our present life, but also the foundation for the proper comprehension of our past."

The national-socialistically-minded professors, loyal to the state and the existing legal system, did not share the peculiar abomination to the past, declared by Böhm. Dislike for tradition was believed by them to be either a "misunderstanding" or a transitory phenomenon. Practically to the very end they could not comprehend why filling the old casks with new, vigorous ideas borrowed from "the new reality" could be an improper and non-constructive activity.

"Did not socialism and national socialism pass still not long ago for incompatible opposites between which one had to choose?" Prof. H.Glockner asked. "And has not the German nation been offered by a brilliant German a synthesis which is not a rotten compromise or a middle-of-the-road course of action, but is an all-embracing and vigorous new state of things? Here too criticism has been at work from the very beginning, but that criticism has been not only negative and disqualifying, but also constructive and interpreted as a development of the past."

Those who disliked the idea of building a "new" philosophy from the traditional substance, were thus opposed with eloquent arguments. There was no talk about simply continuing the tradition: that tradition had to be modernized. "Who can deny that only those links impart the true meaning to the programme of the present movement, in principle conceived by its forerunners?" wrote Prof. T.Haering, an eminent Hegelianist. "It is only when such a living unity of the old and the new takes place that the true heritage of our German spirit can have an illuminating effect upon us and can rise to the demands of the present time. It is only then that it can reach beyond that what /.../ had been previously noticed by the Cusan. Paracelsus, and Böhm."

If the few and isolated cases are disregarded, tradition was not defended in the name of the autonomous values of philosophy; it was stubbornly maintained that tradition was incontestably useful for practical purposes from the ideological and political point of view.

"I claim", Arnold Gehlen wrote, "that in the course of its evolution philosophy has inevitably lost its ability of comprehending political realities. Even such realities as the nation and the race do not occur in it as conceptual predicates, but only as 'ideas' /.../ And yet two factors account for German idealistic philosophy being now an indispensable element of contemporary philosophizing:

1. In that treasure house, now so full of rubbish, we have to find the complex categories which our self-consciousness needs so much.

2. It was a philosophy that could appeal not only to a cognizing man, but also to an active man, a man of action."

Official doctrinaires versus tradition. Different interpretations of the past, which occurred as factors in every-day opinions, came to be manifested – in a manner not devoid of comical elements – in the much discussed issue of predecessors and forerunners. Willy Hoppe, former Rector of Berlin University, came to the conclusion that Arminius, Vidukind, Henry I, Otto I, Lothar, Henry the Lion, Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck all had been *Führers* and Hitler's predecessors. Theodor Haering, a historian of philosophy, was astonished by the regularity with which great personalities which "carried on the fine relay race of spiritual heritage" used to appear on the arena of German intellectual life every hundred years. Haering, Cusan and Eckhardt, and even Albert the Great (whom he called Albert the German) "forerunners of the national socialist rise of German spirit."

Such a professorial interpretation of history, which showed Hitler's Reich as the heir of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and obliterated "the epoch-making breakthrough," obviously could not be approved by the leading doctrinaires. "It is being demonstrated," Alfred Rosenberg wrote, "that the Old Reich was a totalitarian system and that it was governed in an authoritarian way, so that its structure suits best the national socialist political system. This is not only an impudent endeavour to belittle the spiritual revolution of our times, but even a renunciation of that revolution." When mentioning those personalities to which national socialism could refer directly Rosenberg pointed to Nietzsche, Wagner, "the great forerunner" Paul de Lagarde and "the prophet" Houston Stewart Chamberlain. "But," the chief ideologist added, "in none of these cases may we speak of any decisive effect on present-day aspirations."

The official attitude of the doctrinaires toward tradition was marked by a characteristic ambiguity: they used to talk about it much and loftily, but most willingly in terms of non-engaging generalities. By formulating signposts for the teaching of history *Reichsminister* Frick wrote: "National socialism owes its vitality to the most powerful tradition that can be found on this globe: to the eternity of the ever self-renewing nation. It is on that tradition that the work of Adolf Hitler is based."

In the present paper the problem of the social backgrounds of the two types of philosophical consciousness has not been raised. It will be left here unanswered. But it has been possible to establish that both parties to the controversy over "the attitude toward tradition" produced systems of "philosophical" opinions that could function under the Nazi dictatorship and supported it ideologically. Both parties referred to the unchanging properties of the German way of thinking, the German race, and German soul, and tried to force the past to testify in favour of the Nazi system.

Let us also quote the statement by a "traditionalist," Prof. Bruno Bauch, who was President of the German Philosophical Society from 1933 to 1944. "By introducing the category of race philosophy did not fall into extreme naturalism and materialism, nor did it renounce the best and indestructible traditions of German spirit. The acceptance of the natural elements inherent in race, blood and soil not only complies with the most important traditions of German spirit, but even strengthens and develops one of the most profound ideas which German spirit has succeeded in assimilating.

> The Nazi authorities succeeded in eliminating from German philosophical circles a group of scholars who had been declared "ideologically alien" and those who were of Jewish origin

The "traditionalists," who were loudly accused of escapism, political indifferentism, attempts to restore the past system, unwillingness to engage in political activity, and lack of faith in "the new national community," have not left any testimonies that would substantiate those accusations.

The lack of freedom of speech and police terror in Germany at that time do not suffice to explain that fact away, because the institutional status of both groups of philosophers was identical in those respects which in this paper are considered essential. Both groups had their own periodicals, taught in universities, gave public lectures, published articles and books. The possible inequality in influence upon administrative matters, staff policy and the public activity of universities does not seem important for the issues analyzed in the present paper.

And the controversy itself remained unsettled, at least until the miserable end of the social system in which it took place. During World War II the "traditional" philosophers still could publish lengthy volumes to fortify the spirit of their struggling nation, making the rich and powerless German intellectual heritage take part in the total war.

Moloch of history and the discrediting of philosophy. What then were the cause of the long war waged by the zealous followers of Nazi ideology against the loyal representatives of German academic philosophy?

When this question is confronted with the texts left by those authors who at that time played the leading role in institutional philosophy, various systematizing operations yield a picture that brings out the viewpoints of the actors. It is, of course, a one-sided and untrue picture, untrue inasmuch the mental structure of the propounders of Nazi ideology was untrue and historically limited. The opponents and critics of German academic philosophy justified their attitude by various motives and arguments. They may be grouped in three categories.

The first was based on the assertion that a philosophy which is a conglomerate of opposing systems and contradictory opinions must be a factor of disintegration and destruction in a society marked by uniform political, ideological and educational principles. Young people developed a critical attitude and an inclination to question and reject all systems, and that was believed to be the only effect of

philosophical studies. It was pointed to the fact that no system could withstand the criticism of reason deified by philosophy. Thus the claims of reason were interpreted as a proof of the megalomania of philosophers and a manifestation of their contempt for reality. That was why all previous philosophical systems were declared to be more or less morbid and socially disfunctional. At the same time, the necessity of calling to existence a form of a sound and well-functioning philosophy was being noticed.

The second was linked to the binding principle of restoring to German science its allegedly lost German national character. In the field of philsophy this practically resulted in the striving to isolate it from all non-German philsophy and from native traditions and trends declared "un-German" because of their indifferentism in the matters of race, and also because of their cosmopolitism, rationalism, and humanism. Now that tendency, which was deadly to science, was opposed by various philosophers with various compromise ideas, which of course inspired new attacks against academic philosophy by orthodox critics. Academic philosophy was accused of sticking to liberalism, of lacking determination, of being insincere, and of the intention to deprive national socialism of its revolutionary energy. Threats were voiced that all old professors might be replaced by younger men. One of the critics recalled warningly that Frederick Nietzsche was merely 24 when he was offered a Chair by the University of Basel.

The third referred to the indefiniteness of the goals and tasks of philosophy. Its analyses seemed dubious or detrimental from the point of view of political usefulness, and its goal – the search for unattainable truth – was considered to be an Utopian delusion that distracted attention from issues which were then believed to be more important. Closed ranks, obedience, determination, and ruthlessness – these were the traits of character without which the German nation would never attain its goals. And yet in each of the 30 departments of philosophy, which at that time were working in Germany, philosophy was unable to formulate clearly its own guilding idea and to define its tasks and goals except for the unwise habit of accumulating knowledge for knowledge's sake.

Such were the arguments raised most often against academic philosophy in the Third Reich. The achievements of that philosophy were as a rule not ascribed to the glory of being memorable, at the most, someone might have done so in a moment of uncritical exaltation. Much oftener philosophy was regarded as a relic of the past, with which "reality" endowed with the will to remake history still had to cope. Precisely because of that historically retrogressive attitude which was ascribed to it, philosophy was exposed to sharp criticism both from the outside and from within the ranks of philosophers.

In the monthly *Nationalsozialistische Bibliographie,* an official organ of the censorship office which gave marks to almost all current publications in the field of the traditional humanities, publications on philosophy less frequently than the others were marked by the graphical symbol that indicated full approval. The periodical *Volk im Werden,* which had Ernst Krieck as its editor, for many years used to discredit German academic philosophy by claiming that it was useless, sterile and superfluous. Philosophy does not know itself why it still exists. It prolongs its morbid existence from generation to generation, unable to live a true life, but also unable to die." Similar statements were made by Ernst Bergmann, for many years professor of philosophy in Leipzig. "I hope," he wrote in 1937, "that philosophy will no longer stick out like a dead tree in the time of the German spring."

The marasmus of, and the crisis in, philosophy were then a subject matter that was raised often and repeated obsessively. It was suggested that German people had turned their backs on it and did not trust it any more. The author of a book published after the outbreak of World War II and concerned with a synthetic description of that discipline, claimed that "broad circles of the German people, including those with university training, are now prejudiced against philosophy in a way that reminds of the situation one hundred years ago, when the speculative systems broke down."

The past of the philosophy seemed no less scandalous. Famous thinkers who were raising anew the same and always exciting problems to provide a different answer each time drove the doctrinaires into despair. "A young student who is working on the history of philosophy without the assistance of a reliable and trusted guide has the impression of having been thrown into a chaos of systems and trends, in which only one statement remains certain: everyone contradicts everyone." In Professor Bergmann's opinion, a student ought to be offered very little instruction in the history of philosophy, and that only in his later years of university studies, when he has already been immunized against the mind-distorting influences of that discipline. A professor from Giessen, who in the Weimar Republic was the editor of a jubilee edition of Hegel's works, ten years later was of the opinion that those works ought to be accessible only to a small group of specialists who are working on adapting Hegel's texts for the public.

That concentric assault on philosophy was partly aimed at those few professors who, while observing the traditionally German loyalty to the state, wanted to be politically disengaged in their university work. But its true purpose was to discredit philosophy in the eyes of public opinion. It is worth recalling that the campaign against Heidegger's "atheistic and nihilistic" philosophy was launched by Krieck at the time when Nazi Germany started to show marked interest in that philsophy, and its founder, Martin Heidegger, had just intensified to a maximum his political and propaganda activity within the Nazi movement.

By approving and supporting its ambiguous status, academic philosophy was destroyed in the Nazi system not only as a result of an action by external forces, but also became a self-destroying system.

The Nazi authorities succeeded in eliminating from German philosophical circles a group of scholars who had been declared "ideologically alien" and those who were of Jewish origin without provoking untoward effects in the form of a paralysis of philosophical activity. No case of protest in the form of a spontaneous resignation from a university Chair is known to the present author. If old Feuerbach, who preferred to turn a peasant living than to be a Prussian philosopher, found any imitators, then almost as a rule they imitated him because they had been forced to do so, and not by their own will.

The year 1933 did not mark in German philosophy the beginning of hibernation and vegetative immobility. Attitudes characteristic of an "internal emigration" and interest in the techniques of mimicry and camouflage were not frequent, and the philosophical discussions of the period did not have to be concerned with them. After the collapse of the Nazi dictatorship it turned out that the drawers in the writing desks of the "internal *émigrés*" were empty. The public activity of philosophical circles was rather lively in the Third Reich. Philosophers used to meet at congresses convened every three years; they attended meetings of the local branches of the Philosophical Society; listened to, and delivered themselves, various lectures; and did not neglect the opportunity of influencing the broad public by speeches over the radio. First of all, however, they taught in the universities, and published books and papers. It was only *ex post* that their activity came to be truly appraised: it meant participation in a system which no philosophy can justify.

Official and semi-official censors claimed the right to judge philosophers form the heights of "historic tasks," "the will of the nation," "the requirements of the time," "German reconstruction," "German future," and similar hypostases. Philosophers were urged with boring insistence to establish contacts with the new realities and to make up "the philosophy's lagging behind" by adjusting it to the principles of the ideology whose strength and realistic approach to facts History seemed to confirm in a dazzling manner. The parts played by the various actors involved in the conflict seem, unlike in the classical Greek tragedy, to have been determined by circumstances rather than by inevitable necessity. But in the given situation the antiphilosophical campaign was not accidental. The fact that it was launched is not surprising if the extreme incompatibility of the rival values is taken into account.

But the blows aimed at German philosophy from Nazi Olympus do not prove that it was nonconformist. They were not aimed to suppress bold and disobedient ideas, and to curb the desire to criticize everything and everyone, the desire that becomes, and is an attribute of, philosophers. In the Third Reich no one accused them of iconoclasty. If iconoclasts and heretics, attackers of dogmas and debunkers of idols really existed in Nazi Germany, they did not include professional philosophers. ■

Capitalism – it is easy

Chi Kagov

The scholarly literature about capitalism is usually devoted to large-scale problems at the level of society and the country. But it is not easy for the common man with his daily concerns to orient in it and find answers to his everyday questions. While I could answer many of them, sharing the knowledge I have accumulated.

Taxes

There are several kinds of taxes. The main ones are the income taxes: the federal, state (not in all states) and sometimes local.

There are also the state and local taxes added on to the price of the majority of purchases, including food. Then there is the social security tax and a tax on property and realty.

Besides all these, there are even other small local requisitions: yearly state, and sometimes local taxes, licenses for cars, professional licenses, licenses for businesses, an inheritance tax, a school tax, etc.

The income tax in America is progressive: the more you earn the more you pay. There are privileges lowering the amount of the tax: moving expenses, having a big family, medical costs, the number of dependents, the expense of caring for small children, other such expenditures.

All citizens have to fill out a tax form once a year showing the amount of their income tax for that year and send it to the Internal Revenue Service Bureau. Every employer is obliged to regularly take some money for taxes out of a worker's paycheck. If at the end of the year the sum taken out is more than that arrived at on the tax form, the government returns the difference to the worker. But if the sum is less than on the tax form, the worker must pay the difference.

The first year our total family income was below the poverty line. Therefore we didn't have to pay any taxes, and were even given several thousand dollars because there is federal aid to the poor.

The collection of income taxes is constantly adjusted in order to stimulate investment in those areas of the economy where it is needed at the moment most of all. So if things are going bad in the housing construction, certain deductions are introduced for persons (establishments) building their own houses. If little money is being invested in production capacities, some law is introduced stimulating it. And the federal government has other ways as well of using the income tax laws as a means to regulate the state of the economy.

The main success of the economy is due to its organization of production.

Production

The average American, as a rule, is not an entrepreneur, but works for somebody else and quite often changes jobs, even his profession sometimes. Except for those who work for the government, almost all Americans work for private companies: at factories, on farms, and in offices. Usually it is a small company with only 10-20 people or even less. Often it is a family. That size company is the backbone of American companies. But even large enterprises having a thousand or more employees are usually decentralized. They consist of separate, virtually independently run units which may even compete with each other in some cases. Those at the headquarters only coordinate the overall economic and technical strategy.

The large American company I worked for 5 years was a conglomerate made up of 10 small firms. They were not only located in different cities and states, but even in different countries.

Such breaking up into smaller units worked very well. At the head of a company of several thousand employees were thirty two partners who gathered not more than once or twice a year. They summed up the successes and failures, came up with a general plan of action and split the profits. The rest of the time the branches were on their own: they themselves got their clients, orders, finances, set their employment policy and bought their own equipment. None of the daily activity was regulated by anyone.

In the Soviet Union, it was always thought that such a breaking down into smaller units lead to unrational increases in the proportion of administrators in an enterprise. Probably you really do get more managers and office workers. But is that bad or good? In America there is only one criterion – the prime cost of the product. Therefore, when it's profitable no one objects if for every worker there are several managers, administrators and clerks.

My experience of working for a small construction and immovable property company convinced me of this.

Two men owned the firm. They were partners. At times they invited investors depending on the character and amount of work. Besides these two partners, there were another 4-5 people who worked all the time at the company. I was responsible for the technical side of the business, for production. When necessary, I sometimes hired temporary help – one or two extra persons. Some

For the beginning see No. 1/92

parts of projects were subcontracted and I coordinated their work.

Besides me, there were two secretaries who worked there permanently, one of them also doing some administrative work, and a bookkeeper. At the end of each quarter two assistants were taken on to help with the bookkeeping for several days, and at the end of the year these consultants stayed a whole month. And there was a handyman who worked there part time and also was their janitor.

So in all, there was one technical worker, two managers, two secretaries, a bookkeeper, and a part-time handyman. And that company had a multimillion turnover.

That isn't a unique case. The American entrepreneur knows that, in the first place, low paid temporary help saves the time of the expensive skilled worker, and secondly, management is often a more important part of business than production itself.

In the United States, the use of consulting firms is a common practice: it is customary to invite qualified specialists to solve complex problems. This is better than having such people in the company, for there is not enough work to keep them busy 100 percent of the time. Many consulting companies are occupied with training workers on the job, for instance, to use new equipment or computers. Some firms give courses on how to earn money (I don't know about the students, but the teachers usually earn a lot).

The expenditures of the companies on these consultants and instructors are made up for by the higher productivity of the workers and lower labour fluidity. Moreover, it is profitable due to tax privileges: practically all these expenditures are "written off" from the taxes, which is only natural, since the government is interested in the enterprise to flourish.

Entrepreneurship

By entrepreneurship and entrepreneur we mean not the organization of a show, but the entrepreneurship and entrepreneur in general. A man who is ready to risk his material well-being for the sake of some promising business. Such a person doesn't wait until he is fired, but begins his own

business as soon as he feels he is ready. It goes without saying that the earlier a person gets into business, the more time he has to correct the inevitable mistakes. It took me several more years to understand that one's own company was a very attractive thing, and not something undertaken out of necessity.

For many this process goes faster. Sometimes, hurrying to open their own business, people even drop out of college, as did the founder of one of the famous worldwide companies making computers. (Well, with that kind of success one probably doesn't regret not finishing college.)

But not all are so successful. And not all entrepreneurs want to set up big companies. Most dream of their own small, but solid business. Therefore besides the large and small companies in America there are also mini-firms – a one-person firm. It's not difficult to set up such a firm and it's not hard to survive for a while. (In America, there were 9 million mini-businesses in 1991.) Some of them will remain that way. Some of them will quickly fail. But many, having made it through the first critical two to three years, will begin to flourish and some even to grow.

Entrepreneurship is a motto in America, the spirit of entrepreneurship is the morality of American society, and entrepreneurs are the main moving force of the American economy.

A friend of mine, a competent engineer, set up a small factory producing electricity measuring devices some 40 to 45 years ago. There were times when he could have expanded production (and correspondingly increased profits), but he never wanted to. He earned enough as it was. He is proud of the fact that aircraft plants buy his devices and NASA uses them on its satellites and shuttle spaceships. He began the business by himself in his garage. Now 49 people work at his factory. The atmosphere is almost like one big family. He is already 75, but actively runs the business nonetheless, always introducing new technology and computers. In his free time he writes and publishes books on exorcism, is a member of a metaphysical society, and speaks at conferences. He regularly gives to charity organizations. He is a typical American businessman and entrepreneur.

Another friend of mine who recently emigrated from Poland is a car mechanic. While working for his boss, he began to earn additionally in his free time in the evenings. Eventually he had his own clientele. He saved up some money, borrowed the rest and built a small three-car repair shop. Now he works for himself and has turned into an entrepreneur.

Even people with intellectual professions aren't afraid to try other things and get into business. One professor besides teaching at a university made computer programs for sale at home in his garage. After a year it turned into a real business, bringing in huge revenues. Another professor, a renowned historian, set up a business offering subscriptions to newspapers, magazines and books. And a doctor may not only receive and cure patients, but invest his money in property or open a restaurant. An architect may buy and sell art objects or coins on the side. The first violinist in a symphony orchestra may be a partner in a wholesale business. A professional doing some business is a normal phenomenon in America. It is respected and encouraged by society. And for anyone who has some trade – house painter, electrician, a joiner – it's even easier to start his own business.

Of course, to work for someone else is less trouble: someone creates a job for you, gets orders, collects money from the clients and takes on the responsibility for making both ends meet. At night he figures if he has enough money to write out your paycheck, pay the rent for the building, buy equipment and supplies and on and on. And you calmly put in your hours from 9 to 5, and rest on weekends and holidays (something the owner can't always permit himself).

On the other hand, entrepreneurship gives an incomparable sense of personal freedom. It seems to me that anyone who has experienced it would not be likely to turn down an opportunity to become an entrepreneur.

(To be continued)

Inamzhon Usmankhodjayev, 61, former Uzbek Communist Party leader sentenced to 12 years imprisonment for bribe-taking in the "cotton affair," has been released at the solicitation of prison authorities in connection with his poor health. In view of his failing health Usmankhodjayev, who was convicted two years ago, was transferred last autumn from a special prison at Nizhni Tagil to the town of Zarechny, Alma-Ata Region, in Kazakhstan.

Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov recently asked the Soviet parliament's presidium to pardon all the people convicted on charges of corruption in the affair investigated by them from 1983 to 1989. The former investigators explained they did so because the main culprits in Moscow went unpunished, in their opinion.

On graduating from the Tashkent Polytechnical College, Usmankhodjayev designed houses for collective farmers in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan. A party official who once visited the area liked the houses so much that he offered the young architect the post of an instructor in the regional party committee. This is how Usmankhodjayev's party career began.

Usmankhodjayev says that "he did not covet fame and worked indefatigably," rising to the post of chairman of the Uzbek parliament. "I became chairman after I had passed all interviews in Moscow," he recalls. After the death of the Uzbek party's first secretary Sharaf Rashidov in 1983, Usmankhodjayev was elected to this post and, according to him, he immediately demanded that Moscow curtail the unfeasible plan for cotton production. In 1988 he retired on a pension and was arrested ten months later.

In prison, too, Usmankhodjayev continued to regard himself as an honest man. The case against him "was framed up from beginning to end," he contends. However, during the investigation Usmankhodjayev admitted some times that he gave and took bribes. But is it a crime?

* * *

The news that **Ilona Staller**, 41, a porno-star and member of the Italian parliament, is expecting a baby has been flashed by the European gutter press. After a six-month interval the incomparable Cicciolina again poses before cameras – true, in clothes now – demonstrating the visible signs of pregnancy as well as toys she had bought for her future child. "I would like to have a daughter who would resemble her mother in everything and would be as beautiful as I," Ilona says.

Half a year ago Ilona Staller announced her engagement to Jeff Koons, a modern American artist working in the pop-art style (see photo above). This news came like a bolt from the blue to the admirers of her talent. Ilona then declared publicly that she was "ending with" pornography to become a model spouse and housewife. Indeed, Cicciolina was soon forgotten and the couple lived happily. They were well-off for money, the more so that the husband's earnings were more than enough for rich life.

Problems arose in December when Ilona decided to fly to New York, where Jeff had organized one of his exhibitions. To her great suprise, the American embassy denied a visa to Ilona as an "undesirable person." Many people now say ironically that Ilona has remained almost the only one in the "black list" of the US immigration service, which recently allowed even Yasser Arafat to arrive in the country.

"Friends of man" society

Alexander Beliayev, 43, president of the inter-regional cynological association, has been bitten by dogs seven times in his life. However, he continues to love these animals. "In our time of betrayals and the ruin of ideals the dog remains the most faithful friend of man," he says.

A hydraulic engineer by education, Beliayev rose from a janitor to a deputy head of a department in a respectable ministry. He would have become head of a department had not he bought once a pup of an Alsatian, later a winner at the Moscow dog exhibition, the most prestigious in the country. Love for animals proved stronger than sound career-making. Several years ago Beliayev left his post and fully devoted himself to dogs.

It seemed that cynology had no future in the Soviet Union. The breeding and training of dogs was firmly in the hands of the Voluntary Society for Assisting Army, Air Force and Navy, a para-military organization which gave preference to command-style methods of administration. As a result of general liberalization in the country alternative clubs of cynologists were formed and there arose the need of a coordinating body that would not, however, infringe on their independence in any way. An inter-regional cynological association was set up. Today it unites about 80 clubs.

The association has a computer centre which collects information about all pure-bred dogs and engages in pure-strain breeding. Besides, it makes collars, leads and other articles necessary for the "friends of man." The registration fee – one ruble for a dog – is purely symbolic.

A third exhibition of dogs, organized by the Beliayev-led association, took place in Moscow's Sokolniki park recently. Its motto was "Little brothers for orphans." All the money gained thanks to the exhibition was handed to the families of policemen dilled while on duty.

Two cats and two Zwergschnauzers, Dolly and Ricky, coexist peacefully in Alexander Beliayev's home. He is sure that every dog can be trained. "The main thing is to find the right words," he says.

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The disturbed husband promised Ilona that he would complain to President Bush. Cicciolina sent an open letter to all American mothers. "You know, I am a mamma, too," she writes in it. "Well, almost," she adds playfully.

* * *

Alexander Titel, 41, a stage director from the Urals, has become a prominent figure in the domestic musical world. He has staged 17 plays in the Sverdlovsk Opera House. Thanks to them the theatre is now among the five best in the country. The plays include *Hoffmann's Tales* and *The Prophet*. The latter created a real furore among theatre-goers and won a state prize of the USSR. Last November Titel was appointed the head stage director of the Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko music theatre in Moscow.

Alexander Titel was born in Tashkent and came to Moscow with the diploma of an electrical engineer. On graduating from the Institute of Theatrical Art, he went to Sverdlovsk "to gain experience and return to Moscow three years later." He returned to the capital 11 years later.

Titel was not lucky. Following a recent much publicized split in the opera company a considerable part of it joined the principal conductor and left the theatre. Alexander has to stage plays simultaneously with the formation of a virtually new company. It seems he will tackle both tasks with equal pleasure — to pick the necessary "ingredients," mix them up and prepare a delicious "dish." This is what captivates Titel, who can prepare excellent oriental dishes and cakes capable of meeting the tastes of even an experienced gourmand.

In the long dispute on whose role is more important in the staging of an opera — that of a stage director or conductor — Alexander shares the position of those who believe that a play must equally have father and mother, but they must have identical views. He dreams of making his theatre attractive not only for the audience, but also for singers who today prefer foreign contracts to work in their own theatre.

L. Dolgacheva

* * *

Melvin Switzer, an Englishman, has record "vocal qualities." His snoring reaches the level of 87.6 decibels. Such noise is impermissible even for discotheques. No wonder that in the radius of 100 metres the unfortunate neighbours tried to move farther away. His faithful and unfortunate wife Julia was in the worst condition, because she had been put to sound torture for 22 years. She unsuccessfully used most refined methods, pushing toothpaste and pieces of onion into his nostrils and making Melvin wear a belt which did not allow him to sleep on his back.

But recently a plastic semi-ring was designed in Sweden. Put into the nose, it slightly expands the channels, opening a broader passage for air. The snoring record-holder, who was entered into the *Guinness Book*, finally began to sleep quietly.

Switzer proved lucky because a semi-ring helps only 80 percent of snoring people, and now he has a good sleep over many years when a normal night's rest was impossible for him and others. Though Melvin did not snore to awake himself, excessive decibels did not enable him to have a good rest either.

It is said that housing prices are returning to normal in the neighbourhood where Melvin Switzer lives.

A.Polyukhov
our own correspondent
STOKHOLM

The fate of a spy

"I have been literally struck out of the history of Japan," says **Takeo Ioshikawa,** 78, who 50 years ago mastermined an attack on Pearl Harbor and now seeks oblivion in wine. He is damned by thousands of Americans, though they do not even know his name. Ioshikawa is also hated by his compatriots who accuse him of drawing Japan into the war. Some even believe that he is indirectly responsible for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Much has been written about the tragedy of December 7, 1941, when within several minutes the United States lost half of its Pacific fleet. The evidence given by Ioshikawa, who became a spy after he had left his career of a naval officer, throws new light on these events.

In the spring of 1941 Ioshikawa arrived in Honolulu as a vice-consul with the aim of preparing an attack on Pearl Harbor. The Americans behaved lightmindedly, he recalls. Ioshikawa could freely travel on the islands of the archipelago and even fly over the US naval bases on a specially hired plane. He settled in a Japanese tea house near the port and, acting through geishas who met with American sailors, could obtain any information about US warships.

On December 6, 1941 Ioshikawa sent his last cipher telegram to Tokyo, pointing out what American vessels stayed in the harbour. Next day he heard over the Tokyo radio how the announcer slowly repeated twice: "The eastern wind, rain." It was a signal indicating that Japan had decided to attack the United States. Ioshikawa alleges that two more signals were envisaged in case Japan decided to attack Russia and Britain. But these signals were not broadcast.

It was a real inferno. The Japanese lost about 50 men in the attack and the Americans more than 3,000. Shortly after that Ioshikawa was exposed and arrested and then exchanged for American POWs. But neither glory nor honours awaited him on return to Japan. He did not even receive a war veteran pension.

Trying to make both ends meet, Ioshikawa opened a small confectionery. But no one wanted to buy sweets in the shop of a man responsible for the defeat of Japan. He was compelled to exist on the meagre incomes of his wife. "She is the only person in the world who respects me," Ioshikawa says sadly, sipping sake (rice vodka) "She knows that my name has gone down in history. However, history did not treat me fairly."

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Miss Hanoi is unemployed

The Vietnamese revolutionary theatre is dying – the romance of anti-imperialist struggle no longer excites the spectators

After more than forty years of Communist dominance and sixteen years after the war with the US, the Revolutionary Performing Troupes of Hanoi are losing their lustre. Their actors widely known for their courage used to entertain Vietnamese soldiers during the war. Now many of them – old and young alike – have lost jobs and sources of income. The Vietnamese give their preference to American videos, not revolutionary theatricals.

"Our roles are now performed by old-generation politicians," sighs Thuy Nguyen, 33, an actress who had to retire long before the normal retirement age. "Videos are clearly very much to blame for the situation I am in now. Many Vietnamese have bought VCRs and colour TVs in Eastern Europe and people don't come to watch our performances any longer."

Nguyen earns her living by making silk embroidery pictures and selling them to foreigners. She is right: the VCR has become the most treasured luxury item in the slums of Hanoi.

In a modest flat of one retired government official some ten people sit on the floor watching *The Hunt for Red October*, the Hollywood spy blockbuster starring Sean Connery. Some of the spectators are clients who have paid the flat's owner for the opportunity to watch the movie.

"If only I could get the James Bond series, I would earn a fortune," says the owner of the Western gadget who had previously served under Ho Chi Minh.

Foreign movies are in great demand on the Hanoi black market. Movie houses offer only those movies which have been sensored and are of little interest as a result. But if you are prepared to play, black market vendors will offer you uncensored video versions of any movie from westerns to porn. "Actually," says Ha Mai, another retired actress who entertained the Vietkong troops and the people of Hanoi for 35 years, "even the police watch the confiscated copies. The police love videos like the rest of the Vietnamese."

Ha Mai is fond of reminiscences. She occupies a large one-room flat – a privilege granted to her by the government for her outstanding services: housing remains in a chronically short supply in Hanoi. The walls are decorated with black-and-white pictures of Mai performing various heroic parts of women who died fighting the French and the Americans.

"Our task as actors was to inspire comrades for struggle, to remind them to our common heroic goals," Ha Mai said. "That was what we risked our lives for."

Ha Mai's friend, retired actor and choreoghrapher Khan Hoa, carries on:

"The soldiers would have gone crazy without us. It is too difficult to live away from home under unending bombing raids."

Vietnamese theatre has lost to American videos

Hoa got two fragmentation injuries when performing near the Ho Chi Minh trail. Mai and Hoa remember how dedicated they were to the ideas of Marxism and determined to liberate the South from the US control. Today the ideology is dying and the country is being swept by *Doi Moi – perestroika* Vietnamese style. Both of them have concluded that revolutionary theatre was no longer needed.

"Many actors and singers were wounded or died during the war," notes Hoa bitterly. "And now – look at us: we are nothing."

The problem is that there are no modern plays, Thyi Nguyen explains. Old playwrights still write about bad Americans and the heroic people of the North. The main topic remains the same: Communism is great.

"The Hanoi audiences have become younger," Nguyen adds, "they are resentful of communism. Over one third of Vietnam's 67 million population was born in the past two decades. People of this generation are not interested in the war they did not see."

A new type of comedy has recently appeared in Hanoi. It is now a fashion among young people to laugh any time a political leader makes a lenghty speech on TV. When a gray-haired official appears on the screen to make a long speech on the teaching of Ho Chi Minh and the future socialist paradise, young spectators react with roaring laughter and sarcastic remarks. Indeed, politicians have taken the place of actors.

In her last show before retirement Ha Mai played the part of the mother of a killed revolutionary. The heroine of the play has to decide whether to spare "a greedy capitalist" taken prisoner by the revoluitionaries. In a show of Communist magnanimity, she lets him go.

"I spared him," Mai says, mixing real life with theatre, "and he fled to America to send those VCRs here to destroy me. Had I known it would come to this, I wouldn't have let him go."

Andrew Lam,
Pacific News Service

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